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This thesis uses social constructionism to examine the
motives for U.S. intervention in Grenada (1983), Panama
(1989), and Haiti (1994). Content analysis is applied to news
editorials, Congressional in-session remarks and Presidential
addresses, remarks, and press conferences to link national
rhetoric to U.S. intervention policy. The case studies
identify a shift in the pattern of debate within and between
the American public and policy makers simultaneous with the
end of the Cold War. Review of the case studies suggests that
in the future U.S. policy makers must contend with an
intervention policy characterized by: a) multilateralism; b)
vague, mutable national interests; c) obstructionist
Congressional procedures; and d) an intolerance for
casualties. Alone, the information provided by rhetoric is
incomplete, but when combined with analysis of the external
variables that affect the actions of states, the results are
a comprehensive understanding of the dynamic nature of U.S.
foreign policy and an insight into the nature of interventions
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since the end of the Cold War, no topic has been as
politically divisive for U.S. foreign policy as when, where,
why, and how the United States should intervene abroad.
American public opinion regarding U.S. involvement in the
Persian Gulf, Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti has run the gamut
from total support to complete isolationism. These
responses have seemingly centered around the extent to which
U.S. national interests were at risk and objectives could be
achieved with minimal U.S. resources.
This thesis examines the motives for U.S. intervention
in Grenada, Panama, and Haiti using social constructionism;
that is, by linking national rhetoric to military
intervention. The case studies, spanning 1983 through 1994,
were specifically selected in hopes of identifying a shift
in the pattern of debate within and between the American
public and policy makers simultaneous with the end of the
Cold War. The national rhetoric is examined by applying
content analysis to: a) news editorials; b) Congressional
in-session remarks; and c) Presidential addresses, remarks,
and press conferences.
This thesis purports that the uncertainty of the
changing world order has resulted in complicated and
ix
convoluted internal rhetoric surrounding intervention. In
the absence of the monolithic threat that drove the U.S.
approach to intervention during the Cold War, the United
States is confronted with ill-defined national interests and
a lack of consensus on foreign policy priorities resulting
in the following: 1) the reemergence in the foreign policy
arena of longstanding values (e.g., democracy and human
rights) that were submerged beneath the superpower
competition; 2) a reluctance to act unilaterally; and 3) an
intolerance for casualties sacrificed to an ill-defined or
marginal threat.
The rhetoric surrounding the three case studies indeed
suggests that future U.S. policy makers must contend with an
intervention policy chained by a) multilateralism; b) vague,
mutable national interests; c) obstructionist Congressional
procedures; and d) an intolerance for casualties. Though
the United States still accepts leadership in coalitions and
multinational peacekeeping missions, unilateral action by
the United States is no longer acceptable to either the U.S.
public or the global community. This move toward
multilateral action (or at least authorization) as the norm
has become a post Cold War political reality. Additionally,
Presidents will confront a Congress that demands an active
x
role in U.S. foreign policy, particularly when that policy
involves deploying U.S. troops. Following each instance of
U.S. intervention, Congress has attempted (albeit
unsuccessfully) to invoke the War Powers Resolution and has
used it to apply pressure on the President to bring U.S.
troops home. Finally, the nature of U.S. national interests
is so vague and subject to interpretation that policy makers
would benefit by clearly delineating issues and objectives
pertaining to intervention as soon as possible. This would
help them guide the public debate and would facilitate
consensus building. The "rally around the flag" phenomenon
still follows the deployment of U.S. troops, and will likely
continue if casualties are kept to a minimum.
Examination of the rhetoric surrounding these three
most recent interventions in Latin America contributes to an
understanding of the internal variables affecting U.S.
foreign policy. The application of social constructionism
implies that the meaning the American public and policy
makers attach to issues shapes their beliefs about national
interests. Because meanings and beliefs are constructed
through ongoing interaction, they are constantly changing.
When the public and policy makers of the United States
convince themselves that issues justify intervention, U.S.
xi
military forces are mobilized. Alone, the information
provided by rhetoric is incomplete, but when combined with
analysis of the external variables that affect the actions
of states, the results are a comprehensive understanding of
the dynamic nature of U.S. foreign policy and insight into
the nature of interventions in the post Cold War world.
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I . INTRODUCTION
A. THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST APPROACH TO INTERVENTION
Since the end of the Cold War, no topic has been as
politically divisive as when, where, why, and how the United
States should intervene abroad. American public opinion
regarding U.S. involvement in the Persian Gulf War,
Somalia's internal conflict, the Bosnia war, and the ousting
of Haiti's military de facto government has run the gamut
from total support to complete isolationism. These
responses have seemingly depended upon the extent to which
U.S. national interests were at risk and to the extent
humanitarian objectives could be achieved with minimal U.S.
resources. Loss of U.S. lives has become a sensitive
subject in American opinion polls, unless the government can
justify soldiers' deaths. 1
In Peacekeepers and Their Wives: American Participation
in the Multinational Force and Observers , David and Mady
Segal compile and analyze U.S. peacekeeping operations—the
latest challenge confronting U.S. interventionism. As they
explore changes in the nature of the function of the U.S.
Army, reconstruct the history of peacekeeping, and pose
xAndrew Kohut and Robert C. Toth, "Arms and The People,"
Foreign Affairs , vol. 36, no. 6., November-December 1994,
pp. 47-62.
unresolved challenges to future leaders, they conclude there
are three basic approaches to society's relationship with
the military: functional , conflict, and social
constructionism. The functional approach explains the
behaviors of organizations in relation to the way they serve
society's needs. In this view, the armed forces are defined
by their ability to meet society's need for national
security. The conflict approach emphasizes the procedures
that subordinate the interests of the military members to
the interests of the policy-making elites. This approach is
taken by Peter Calvert in The Foreign Policy of New States
,
in which he concludes that foreign policy is "the occupation
of a very small elite dominated above all by considerations
of their own political survival."
Social constructionism is a sociological perspective
that emphasizes organizations as the product of human
behavior. In this view, the military is the product of the
beliefs and values of its members and of the members of the
larger society with which it interacts. Given that the
beliefs, values, and modes of interaction are constantly
changing, so too is the role and identity of the military. 2
2Dana P. Eyre, David R. Segal, and Mady Weschler Segal, "The
:ocial Construction of Peacekeeping, " in David R. Segal and Mady
The Segals use this approach to examine the motivations and
responses of soldiers to the demands placed on them. It is
the goal of this paper to apply the concept of social
constructionism to the broader realm of foreign policy,
specifically to the debate surrounding U.S. interventionism.
Applying social constructionism to U.S. foreign policy
implies that the meaning the American public and policy
makers attach to issues shapes their beliefs about national
interests. Because meanings and beliefs are constructed
through ongoing interaction, they are constantly changing.
Likewise, the definition of national interests and perceived
threat to those interests change. As the public and policy
makers of the United States convince themselves that issues
justify intervention, U.S. military forces are mobilized.
In the United States, the evolution of the beliefs and
meanings largely occurs in the exchanges among and between
the President, Congress, and the general public. Thus
Presidential speeches, Congressional debates, and public
concerns manifested through news editorials all contribute
to the when, where, and why of U.S. intervention.
Weschler Segal Peacekeepers and Their Wives: American
Participation in the Multinational Force and Observers Chap IV
(Cal: Stanford University, 1994), pp 42-6.
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the motives for
U.S. intervention in Grenada, Panama, and Haiti using social
constructionism, that is, by linking internal rhetoric to
military intervention. The case studies in the following
chapters attempt to identify a shift in the pattern of
debate within and between the American public and policy
makers simultaneous with the end of the Cold War. The
hypothesis is that the uncertainty of the changing world
order has resulted in complicated and convoluted internal
rhetoric surrounding intervention. In the absence of the
monolithic threat that drove the U.S. approach to
intervention during the Cold War, the United States is
confronted with ill-defined national interests and a lack of
consensus on foreign policy priorities resulting in the
following ramifications: 1) the reemergence in the foreign
policy arena of longstanding values (e.g. democracy and
human rights) that were submerged beneath the superpower
competition; 2) a reluctance to act unilaterally; and 3) an
intolerance for casualties sacrificed to an ill-defined or
nonexistent threat.
B. FRAMING THE RESEARCH
To evaluate a shift in the internal rhetoric
surrounding the decision to use U.S. military force, three
4
case studies are examined: Grenada, Panama, and Haiti.
These case studies were chosen because the invasions
occurred in the same region, spanned the collapse of the
Cold War, and were implemented by the three most recent
Presidential administrations.
The United States enjoys a peculiar relationship with
Latin America, a relationship steeped in a history of U.S.
intervention. Since 1823, when the Monroe Doctrine declared
U.S. hegemony in the western hemisphere, the United States
has formally and openly sent military forces into Latin
America over thirty times. The Central Intelligence Agency,
since its origin in 1947, has spearheaded covert military
operations on at least four additional occasions. 3 During
the last decade, the Monroe Doctrine has only been mentioned
in passing by policy makers, and never to justify
intervention. 4
3Frank Niess, A Hemisphere to Itself: A History of U.S.-
Latin American Relations (New Jersey: Harry Drost, 1990.)
Appendix 5 details a "chronology of major armed U.S.
interventions in Latin America since 1853." Given that the
chronology stops with the invasion of Grenada in 1983, I include
the interventions in Panama, El Salvador, and Haiti in the count
of thirty.
4Gaddis Smith, The Last Years if the Monroe Doctrine, 1945-
1993, (New York:Hill and Wang, 1994)
.
In most circumstances the United States prefers
participation in multilateral military operations. The
advantages to multilateral coalitions include shared costs,
increased flexibility, and greater public support. Latin
America is the only region in which the United has
consistently opted for unilateral military action. The 1994
intervention in Haiti is the first exception, in that U.N.
forces began replacing U.S. forces after the initial
occupation. Even in Haiti, however, U.S. troops landed
alone. The unique status of Latin America aside, the other
advantage to choosing three case studies from the same
region is the elimination of one more external variable
(namely, regional biases in U.S. foreign policy) that could
account for a shift in rhetoric.
The three case studies were also selected based on the
time line they comprise. Not only are they the three most
recent examples of U.S. intervention in Latin America
(intervention narrowly defined as open and formal deployment
of military forces to alter the characteristics or behavior
of another country's government), they encompass the
transition from Cold War balance of power to the current
world order. In 1983, President Reagan explained the
invasion of Grenada as the need to protect the United States
and the western Hemisphere from the spread of communism. In
1989, as the Soviet Union was already facing collapse,
President Bush explained the invasion of Panama as the need
to protect American citizens from one man—General Manuel
Antonio Noriega. Five years later, in 1994, President
Clinton attempted to explain the invasion of Haiti without
citing the underlying need to protect American territory
against an overwhelming flood of refugees. He focused
instead on the restoration of a democratically elected
government and on protecting Haitian citizens from human
rights atrocities. The three cases span a mere twelve years
and are within the same region; yet very different
explanations were given to the American public and the
global community to justify military action.
The time periods from which data is collected and
analyzed vary according to each of the case studies. Each
period begins with the first mention of the country in
question by a Congressional or Presidential remark, or a
news editorial. Data continues to be extracted until after
U.S. military forces began arriving in the target country.
For coding purposes this period is referred to as the Post
Invasion Response Period (PIP) , and allows comparison
between the pre-invasion and post invasion rhetoric. The
number of days in the PIP also varies between case studies.
Initially, when examining the Haiti and Panama invasions, I
extended the analysis for three days following the
deployment of troops and noticed no significant change in
rhetoric within those three days, so I stopped, feeling I
had adequately measured post invasion rhetoric. When
examining the Grenada invasion, however, I discovered that
there was not a significant amount of pre-invasion rhetoric,
so I extended the PIP to include all data through the final
mention of the invasion ten days after the deployment of
troops. As there was no change in rhetoric over time during
the PIP for the Grenada case study, I make the assumption
that there was similarly no change in rhetoric over time in
the Panama and Haiti case studies. Thus the PIP for each




The national discourse surrounding the U.S.
interventionism was examined by applying content analysis to
the primary media of expression used by the President,
Congress, and the general public. The President's official
stance was taken from the Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents and included all addresses, news conferences, and
8
official remarks concerning the case countries. Official
messages to Congress and letters within the executive branch
contain policy and not opinion or justification for
direction; therefore they were not analyzed.
The most accurate and complete account of discussions
in the Senate and House of Representatives is contained in
the Congressional Record . Each instance a Congress member
addressed U.S. policy toward a case country was treated as a
separate and equal unit of analysis, whether the member
spoke for two minutes or two hours, or submitted a written
statement to the record.
The most transparent expression of public opinion
available for content analysis is news editorials. To
ensure a variety of demographic profiles, all editorials
mentioning the case countries were retrieved from Editorials
on File , an objective compilation of editorial opinion
selected from over 150 daily North American Newspapers-
including both the Wall Street Journal and the Billings
(Mont.) Gazette. Given that the focus was U.S. opinion, all
articles extracted from Canadian newspapers were discarded.
Then, to enhance coverage of the mainstream debate, the
data set included pertinent Op-Ed columns from the New York
Times
. In the third case study, Haiti, the analysis results
of the editorials were compared with concurrent Gallup Polls
for commentary purposes only.
The completed data base, using all three sources,
encompassed approximately two hundred units of analysis per
case study--a comprehensive selection of main arguments and
concerns within the policy maker and public arenas. The
units were analyzed using an original coding scheme. The
categories were formed from recurring ideas identified
during an initial review of the editorials, Congressional
remarks, and Presidential speeches. The debate was thus
framed by the subject material rather than the analyst or
external forces. The first reading of the materials
generated fifteen to twenty subthemes that were collapsed
into roughly seven main themes, depending on the case study.
Each article was subjected to a second reading to determine
and document which of the main themes dominated its content;
then "1" or "0" was assigned to all categories of subthemes,
according to their respective use or lack thereof.
D. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
1. Foreign Policy Research
Most literature about foreign policy and U.S.
intervention focuses on the external factors that justify
military interference and the steps needed to ensure a
10
successful mission. The literature of the early 1990'
s
additionally mentions the relationship of public support to
the decision by policy makers to intervene. In
Intervention: The use of American Military Force in the
Post-Cold War World , Richard N. Haas depicts basic
guidelines on when and how to use force to achieve a broad
range of foreign policy objectives. He includes national
interests, feasibility of success, and desirability of
intervention as a few important considerations for policy
makers. He notes that recent years have evidenced declining
popular and Congressional support for military
interventions, and suggests that tolerance for costs
directly relates to the national interests at stake. He
does not suggest that public opinion should be the dominant
factor in determining whether to intervene, but concedes
that a successful intervention often creates its own support
in the aftermath. 5 Arnold Kanter and Lenten F. Brooks
edited a book that makes recommendations for future foreign
policy decisions based on a review of force structure and
available technology. Kanter and Brooks also stress the
importance of clarifying national interests and comparing
5Richard N. Haas, Intervention: The Use of American Military





the costs and benefits of military response to determine the
nature of intervention. 6
Writing during the Cold War, William V. O'Brian delved
into the legal and moral guidelines that justify decisions
to engage in or abstain from military interference. He
outlined three situations that warrant intervention: (1)
another international actor has intervened with armed force;
(2) [U.S.] nationals and other foreign nationals are in
clear and present danger because of a civil war or collapse
of authority; (3) massive human rights violations of the
subjects of the target state warrant humanitarian
intervention. 7 Thirteen years later, Ted Galen Carpenter
remarked on the obsessiveness of the United States with
maintaining stability in the world— a more difficult task
since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and posited three
very different occasions that justify intervention: (1) to
prevent political instability in important client states;
(2) to install or pressure regimes considered friendly to
perceived economic and security interests; and (3) to coerce
6Lenten F. Brooks and Arnold Kanter (eds.) U. S
.
Intervention Policy for the Post Cold War World: New challenges
and new responses
,
(New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1994.)
7William V. O'Brian, "U.S. Military Intervention: Law and
Morality," The Washington Papers Vol. 7, (Washington D.C.:
Georgetown University, 1979.)
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unfriendly regimes. 8 Galen stated that to maintain public
support, U.S. leaders have exaggerated the importance of the
conflict and emphasized the moral imperative of U.S.
reaction, but the justifications have shown little
resemblance to the underlying political, economic, or
strategic motives for intervention. 9
2. Public Opinion Literature
During the last decade, the literature on public
opinion, its development and interpretation, has flourished.
Vincent Price traces the historical and philosophical
linking of the term "public", meaning common access and/or
concern, and the term "opinion." He then divides the public
into four categories: "elite, attentive, voting, and
general." 10 Unlike many of his counterparts who profess the
masses to be uninformed and fickle, Price is impressed with
the rational nature of societal discourse. Other
sociologists, such as Joseph R. Gusfield, examine the
process through which phenomena become issues for public
8Ted Galen Carpenter, "Direct Military Intervention, " in
Peter Schraeder (ed.), Intervention into the 1990' s: U.S. Foreign
Policy in the Third World , Chap IX, (Boulder Col: Lynne Reinner
Publishers, 1992) p. 154.
9 Ibid.
10Vincent Price, Public Opinion (Newberry Park, Cal: Sage
Press, 1992.)
13




In Faces of Internationalism , George R. Wittkopf
explores the way average and elite Americans view their
country's relations with the rest of the world and assess
dangers and responsibilities. Like Price, he concludes that
the public is far more sophisticated and structured than
prevailing stereotypes insinuate. Wittkopf also alludes to
the influential nature of mass beliefs that persuade policy
making elites by ensuring foreign policy issues remain in
the forefront as election issues. He says that the divisive
sense in foreign policy stems not from apathy but from
doubts about the nature and extent of American involvement
in world affairs. 12
The increasing connection between public opinion and
U.S. foreign-policy making suggests the importance of
determining what influences shape the collective foreign
policy. In an age of increasing technology the impact of
media coverage on formulation of political agendas and
nJoseph R. Gusfield, The Culture of Pubic Problems:
Drinking-Driving, and the Symbolic Order
,
(Chicago, 111:
University of Chicago Press, 1981.)
12George R. Wittkopf, Faces of internationalism
,
(Durham and
London: Duke University Press, 1990.)
14
opinions is of no little concern. Edna Einseidel, Maxwell
McCombs, and David Weaver researched the effect of the news
media on public opinion. They concluded that while the
press helps legitimize issues raised by other social
institutions, it does not set agendas. The press exercises
influence in the raising of social issues, but it rarely
alters opinions that are firmly held by the public. 13
Similarly, Donald L. Jordan and Benjamin Page used analysis
of television news broadcasts before and between opinion
surveys to estimate the impact of news stories from various
sources on opinion. They determined that while actions by
media commentators, opposition leaders, and the President
have a large effect on opinion, the impact of other news
sources is negligible. 14 Other reviews of the polls
indicate that Americans are more concerned with domestic
issues, even though most believe the U.S. should continue as
a world superpower. 15
13Edna Einseidel et al Contemporary Public Opinion: Issues
and the News
,
(New York: L. Erlbaum Press, Inc. 1991.)
14Donald L. Jordan and Benjamin Page, "Shaping Foreign
Policy Opinions: The role of T.V. News," Journal of Conflict
Resolution , Jun 1992 v36 n2 pp. 227-242.
15Kenneth Jost, "Foreign Policy and Public Opinion: Have
Americans grown tired of world affairs?" CQ Researcher , July 15,
1994 vol. ,4 no. 26, p. 603.
15
3. Social Constructionist Literature
The formulation of foreign policy and beliefs come
together in social constructionism. Reflecting that view,
Murray Edelman posits that government policies and solutions
are determined by influence and ideologies. Just as
political developments are the creation of the publics
concerned with them, public opinion is a political symbol
used by policy making strategists. In The Symbolic Uses of
Politics , he explores the way ordinary peoples' values enter
into the decisions of public organs and the extent to which
procedures weight some groups' values over others. Rather
than focus on the interests of officials and elites, like so
many of his predecessors, Edelman addresses the importance
of creating meaning and choosing language in politics,
keying on the interpretation of events by the people
affected by policy. The perception of political fact is the
rock upon which is built a structure of beliefs; therefore,
the same news accounts may generate contradictory factual
premises. He uses the U.S. invasion of Grenada as an
example
.
For some Americans the invasion of Grenada in
1983 was a wise course of action because American
medical students on the island were in danger of
becoming hostages, and because of the related
"fact" that Cuba was establishing a military base
16
there to support subversion in other Latin
American countries. For other Americans and most
European governments the medical students were in
no danger and could have left on a commercial
airliner if they wished, and the Grenadian
political turmoil reflected internal social
tensions rather than external communist threat. 16
Along a similar line of thinking, Terrence Bell, James Farr,
and Russell L. Hanson compiled a collection of essays that claim
politics is anchored in linguistics, but that the concepts that
shape political beliefs and behavior change in reaction to real
political events. 17
Finally, social constructionism is epitomized in David
Campbell's Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and
Politics of Security. Campbell denounces the realist framework
of the anarchical state system. He posits that foreign policy is
a series of interpretations or "readings" about the identity of
domestic society and the challenges that threaten hegemonic
understandings of American culture and practice. He does not
16Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics
,
(Chicago,
111: University of Illinois, 1985) p. 204. See also Edelman,
"Contestable Categories and Public Opinion, " political
Communication , vol. 10, no. 3, July-Sep 1993, pp 231-243. For a
critique of Edelman' s theory see Lance W. Bennett, "Constructing
Publics and Their Opinions," Political Communication , vol. 10,
no. 2, April-June 1993, pp. 101-122.
17Terrence Bell et al, (eds.) Political Innovation and
Conceptual Change
,
(Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press,
1989. )
17
imply that foreign policy is set by domestic issues, but that the
U.S. concept of American identity shapes U.S. relations with
other countries. Threats to national security do not originate
from outside the state. Instead, they are indigenously devised
by a state's need to maintain an identity. 18 When applied to the
end of the Cold War, Campbell's conclusion would indicate that
the collapse of the Soviet Union did not diminish an external
threat, but left the United States with an identity crisis. The
United States would then need to generate new threats to replace
the Soviet Union, possibly resulting in greater numbers of
interventions than during the Cold War.
E. THE POLICY MAKING PROCESS
Before delving into the realm of political debate, it is
necessary to review the policy making process with regard to the
roles of the President, Congress, and the American public. Only
in a democracy are the rulers accountable to the ruled. The
constraints placed on the three bodies recalls Alexis de
Tocqueville ' s dilemma: how does a government sustain a cogent
18David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign





foreign policy while satisfying the ideals of a democratic
republic? 19 Each of the three roles are examined below.
1. The President and Foreign Policy
When the U.S. founding fathers drafted the constitution,
they allocated to the President the authority and responsibility
to conduct war. To Congress, however, was reserved the authority
to declare war and commit the nation to significant foreign
involvement. Congress also maintained the Army and the Navy.
The President, as Commander in Chief, was responsible for the
negotiations of treaties and the daily conduct of diplomacy.
Before any treaties were engraved in stone, however, they were
ratified by two thirds of the Senate. Though an inspired effort
at checks and balances, the founding fathers' system frustrated
foreign and military affairs for the next 150 years.
The first major change to the checks and balances system was
initiated during the Truman administration in 1947. The National
Security Act of 1947 directly expanded the executive branch of
the government and indirectly extended Presidential powers. The
Act established the Department of Defense by combining the
Department of War and the Department of the Navy. It also
established the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National
19Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America , vol.1 (New
York: Vintage Press, 1945) p. 243.
19
Security Council to facilitate the implementation of foreign
policy. This expansion of the executive branch was in response
to America's increased role in the world. It was designed to
give the President increased flexibility. Like all
bureaucracies, however, it added further constraints to the Chief
Executive Officer and the policy making process.
Nathan and Oliver, in Foreign Policy Making and the American
Political System , noted that Presidential power has run in
cycles. The 1940 ' s-1960 ' s were the decades of the "imperial
president." Congress consistently acquiesced to Executive
initiative and consumed itself with other affairs. Then,
following Vietnam and Watergate in the mid-1970 's, presidential
power was placed on a tight leash as Congress resumed a more
active role in the policy process and the public monitored the
government with increased interest. By the mid-1980' s the
pendulum reversed and Ronald Reagan as president (1981-1989)
enjoyed tremendous leniency and freedom to pursue policy. Not
even the Iran Contra scandal elicited electoral retribution, as
seen by the 1988 election to president of former Vice President
George Bush, who had been implicated in the affair. President
Bush sustained enormous popularity following the Gulf War, until
20
domestic economic problems and the collapse of the Soviet Union
sent the pendulum back the way it had come. 20
In short, the President is not the king of the hill
commanding bureaucratic organizations to do his bidding. The
President does assume office with his own set of priorities,
which he attempts to implant through key anointments. But those
appointments do not match the experience of an expansive foreign
affairs bureaucracy. Throughout his term, the President is the
focus of foreign affairs, and he proposes policy and structures
the terms of the national debate; but he must contend with well-
established institutions, a convoluted bureaucracy, and a
ceaseless flow of foreign policy. Particularly now that the Cold
War is over, the President is faced with a complex global
environment that could prove less conducive to American power and
American interests.
2. The Congress and Foreign Policy
Congress, as the constitutionally mandated partner of the
President, has played an active role in U.S. foreign policy, to
an extent varying over time. From the mid-1940 's through the
mid-1960 's, when one party controlled both the Congress and the
Presidency, majority leaders acted as "loyal and largely
20James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, Foreign Policy Making
and the American Political System (3rd ed.), (Baltimore,
Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994) p. 10.
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uncritical lieutenants" of the President on foreign and defense
policy. 21 During this period there was a general sentiment among
policy makers that constitutional checks and balances were
impediments to the tasks of world leadership. 22 The Vietnam War
destroyed that consensus. Confidence in the presidency as the
font of all foreign policy wisdom began to disintegrate; and
Congress asserted its constitutional powers to a greater extent
than had yet been seen in the twentieth century. 23
The War Powers Resolution of 1973 was the most significant
piece of legislation passed by Congress since the National
Security Act of 1947. The War Powers Resolution, passed over a
Presidential veto, required the President to consult with and
report to Congress concerning the involvement of U.S. armed
forces in any conflict and allowed Congress to stop a war at any
time by passing a concurrent resolution. U.S. forces could be
brought home by a simple majority vote of the House and Senate.
21James M. Lindsey, and Randall B. Ripley (eds.) Congress
Resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol Hill
,
(Mich:
University of Michigan Press, 1993) pp. 209.
22 Ibid, p. 72.
23Edmund S. Muskie, Kenneth Rush, and Kenneth W. Thompson
The President, Congress, and Foreign Policy: A Joint Policy
Project of the Association of Former Members of Congress and the
Atlantic Council of the United States
,
(Lanham, Maryland:
University of America Press, Inc., 1986), p. 18.
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It also stipulated that the President report to Congress within
forty-eight hours after beginning hostilities. It allowed the
President to deploy troops for sixty days without Congressional
approval and a subsequent thirty days to ensure a safe
withdrawal. 24 During the 1970 's, Congressional power was also
increased through the creation of budget committees and the
expansion of the House of Representative's Foreign Affairs
Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
The mid-1980' s brought a return to the Presidential upper
hand in the relationship because Congress was facing internal
crises. Congress has always been divided along party lines to an
extent driven by the changing extremes of ideologies. The 1980 's-
1990 's saw a shift in control of the Senate from Republican to
Democrat and back again. It was a decade of frequent deadlocks
between the parties. Then in 1989, the financial scandal
involving several members of Congress and bounced checks painted
an image to the public of arrogant elites who perverted the
institution for their own interests. Several Senators and
Congressmen stepped down or were retired by voters. January 1993
brought the newest, most junior Congress since WWII. In one
year, the House and Senate became less predictable than they had
been since Vietnam.
24Lindsey and Ripley, pp. 211-212
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3. The Public and Foreign Policy
Noted historian Thomas A. Baily wrote, "If the ordinary
American wants to know who shapes fundamental foreign policy, all
he has to do is look in the mirror." 25 Because of the demands
placed on foreign policy by democratic accountability, policy
makers walk a fine line in their relationship with the public.
Public opinion can neither be discounted nor can it be counted on
in long term diplomatic design.
Eugene Wittkopf divides the public into three categories:
"attentives, " "inattentives, " and the "mass public." The
"attentives" are comprised of less than ten percent of the public
and display levels of knowledge and ideas similar to the policy
making elite. Likewise, the "inattentives"' constitute less than
ten percent of the public. They, however, have very low levels
of information and demonstrate poorly formed views of foreign
affairs. The remainder of the population, over eighty percent,
possesses a basic knowledge and coherent attitudes even though
they do not always display detailed factual knowledge of foreign
25Thomas A. Baily, A Diplomatic History of the American
People (10th ed., 1980) p. 3, cited in Kenneth Jost, "Foreign
Policy and Public Opinion: Have Americans grown tired of world
affairs?" CQ Researcher , vol. 4, no. 26, July 15, 1994, p. 611,
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policy. Wittkopf, then, describes public opinion as built on an
uneven factual base and interest level. 26
Daniel Yankelovich suggests that if the public is given all
the facts, they will form intelligent opinions on foreign policy.
Yankelovich' s research during the Cold War revealed that two
primary fears drove public opinion: (1) nuclear war threatening
human existence; (2) Soviet expansionism threatening American
cultural existence. 27 Without these fears it is more difficult
for the policy makers to justify the deployment of troops to the
public. Since a high degree of public support is the foundation
of successful foreign policy in a democracy, the policy makers
frequently resort to "hard sell" methods, exaggerating aspects of
the situation that they hope will invoke support from the
populace
.
Public attitude has changed toward the role of the United
States in the international community. Where once the use of
U.S. military force was deemed inevitable, it is now seen as the
extreme solution to conflict and only as a means to provide
humanitarian aid and assistance to allies under attack. 28 The
26Nathan and Oliver, p. 153.
27Daniel Yankelovich and Sidney Harmon Starting With the
People
,
(Boston: Houghton Miffil Press, 1988) p. 100.
28Catherine M. Kelleher, "Soldiering on: U.S. public opinion
on the use of force," Brookings Review , vol. 12, no. 2, (Spring
25
"rally 'round the president" syndrome of previous years no longer
exists, if it ever did. Statistics have shown that while
Presidential popularity and approval ratings consistently rise in
moments of crisis (those that are prominently covered by the
media), popular support recedes soon after. 29 The ambiguous and
tense relationship between authority and accountability has
become even more uncertain as the United States adjusts its
leadership role in the new world order.
F. SUMMARY
As earlier stated, this thesis attempts to assess the
motives for U.S. interventionism in Grenada, Panama, and Haiti
by linking internal rhetoric to military intervention. The case
studies in the following chapters attempt to identify a shift in
the pattern of debate within and between the American public and
policy makers concurrent with the end of the Cold War. But
internal rhetoric alone will neither fully explain nor predict
the actions the United States chooses to take in its foreign
policy.
1994), p. 26.
29Bradley Lian and John R. O'Neal, "Presidents, the Use of
Military Force, and Public Opinion, " Journal of Conflict
Resolution , vol. 37, no. 2, June 1993, pp. 277-301. Lian and
O'Neal conducted a study of presidential popularity following
major uses of force between 1950-1984. They determined that of
102 cases, the mean change in the President's approval rating was
0%, even among members of his own party.
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Social constructionism, while linking internal rhetoric to
U.S. foreign policy decisions, does not account for external
variables, such as actions taken by de facto governments of the
case study countries. Social Constructionism does not consider
world events, related or otherwise, that may alter the U.S.
foreign affairs agenda, nor does it consider pressures from the
global community through organizations like the United Nations or
through multilateral business organizations. It is also unable
to account for covert variables that may influence foreign policy
(such as the Central Intelligence Agency's relationship with
General Manuel Antonio Noriega prior to the invasion of Panama)
,
and the hidden agendas of policy makers who might be linking
political issues together to achieve an unrevealed goal.
The importance of social constructionism is in its ability
to reveal how the American public and policy makers are framing
the issues of foreign policy--the reality they are constructing
through their debates. The pieces of information on which the
public and policy makers choose to focus is significant because
their perceptions and reactions will influence foreign policy
decisions. Whether the public and policy makers debate different
issues is significant, as is the relationship of those debates
with real world events. More than a commentary on a changing
society, an understanding of society's beliefs and concerns and
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how they are changing can aid political strategists in framing
issues so as to gain public support and influence decisions of
key policy makers.
In a summer 1994 interview with the Los Angeles Times , Henry
Kissinger remarked that American foreign policy hinges on the
"Symbiotic relationships between the President, the media, and
the public. This concept was born out of the notion that the
United States has a unique global responsibility and that the
public needs to be affirmed of such a notion." Kissinger also
indicated that it is "necessary to analyze what reality is
imposing on us independent of our values... The query is [whether]
the two [approaches] can be combined." 30 Social constructionism
contributes to an understanding of the internal variables
affecting U.S. foreign policy previously neglected by scholars.
When combined with analysis of the external variables that affect
the actions of states, the result is a more comprehensive
understanding of the dynamic nature of U.S. foreign policy.
30Tony Day and Doyle McManus, "Photo-op Foreign Policy, " New
Perspectives Quarterly , vol. 11, no. 3, (Summer 1994), pp. 42-44.
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II. GRENADA: OPERATION URGENT FURY
This Chapter illustrates one example of national
rhetoric during the Cold War, when commonly held beliefs
about the Soviet Union and the possibility of nuclear attack
added a fearful dimension to U.S. foreign policy. During
this period, the U.S. impression of the world was
reminiscent of old movies in which two cowboys faced each
other at high noon. The United States was the defender of
freedom and justice and the Soviet Union wore black. The
U.S. approach to intervention was driven by perceived threat
to U.S. citizens, democracy, and peace. But it also hinged
on a national perception of the United States as the good
guy, the lone heroic defender of its own.
Given the Cold War beliefs about the world, during the
Grenada invasion President Reagan had to convince the
American public that a) a Communist dictator was directly
threatening the lives of U.S. citizens on the island; b) the
Soviet Union was maneuvering into a position to threaten the
United State; and c) that the United States was acting
benevolently and heroically. In fact, the only domestic
opposition to the Grenada invasion came from a minority of
the public and Congress who remained unconvinced of the
threat to U.S. citizens and who feared the United States was
29
adapting imperialist characteristics similar to the Soviet
Union.
A. THE INVASION
At 5:30 a.m. on October 25, 1983, approximately 1900
U.S. Marines and Army Rangers began landing at Pearls and
Pt . Salines airports on the island of Grenada. A small
additional force was provided by six Caribbean states.
Resistance was stronger than expected; there were more
Cubans on Grenada than had been estimated by U.S. sources.
By 2 6 October, however, most pockets of Cuban and Grenadian
resistance were eliminated and U.S. troops were able to
evacuate U.S. citizens through Pearls Airport, which had
been closed since a coup on 19 October. The invasion,
dubbed Operation Urgent Fury, was the first large-scale,
overt U.S. military intervention in the Western Hemisphere
since the invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965.
President Reagan said that the United States was
responding to a call from the Organization of Eastern
Caribbean States (OECS) to help restore law and order in
Grenada, where Prime Minister Maurice Bishop had been
overthrown and assassinated by hardline members of the
ruling New Jewel Movement (NJM) the previous week. U.S.
relations with Bishop had been strained at best, but the new
30
leadership under General Hudson Austin was even less
conducive to regional stability. Grenada's ties with Cuba
and the Soviet Union fostered fears in the United States and
surrounding Caribbean countries of Soviet expansion in the
region. Additionally, General Austin imposed a twenty- four
hour curfew and ordered his soldiers to shoot violators on
sight. This action was interpreted by the U.S. government
as a threat to approximately 1,100 U.S. citizens living in
Grenada, most of whom were medical students at St. George's
University School of Medicine. President Reagan called the
operation a "rescue mission;" Prime Minister Eugenia Charles
of Dominica, Chairman of OECS, called it a "response to
countries comprising one region asking for support." 1
Others were not so generous.
World leaders reacted negatively to the attack.
France, Canada, and West Germany harshly condemned U.S.
action, as did the majority of delegates to the Organization
of American States. Even Reagan's closest European ally,
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, expressed "very
xFacts on File , vol. 43, No. 2241, October 28, 1983, pp
09-10.
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considerable doubts" about the invasion to President
Reagan. 2
The U.S. Congress and the American public were caught
off guard by the invasion, and opinion was divided as to
whether or not the United States should have intervened.
Congress raised questions as to the legality of the invasion
and debated the applicability of the War Powers Resolution.
This chapter examines the U.S. rhetorical debate
surrounding the Grenada invasion and notes among other
themes an overwhelming concern for the safety of U.S.
citizens as well as a fear of Communist expansion. Prior to
analysis of the rhetorical themes in the U.S. public,
Congressional, and Presidential arenas I will explain the
case study's research design.
B. RESEARCH DESIGN
The time period examined in this case study extends
from March 21, 1983 through November 4, 1983 for the public
opinion data set and Presidential remarks data set.
President Reagan initiated U.S. public discussion on Grenada
on March 21, 1983 when he showed pictures of the Soviet-
sponsored airport under construction on the Island. His
warnings of Soviet expansionism in the region prompted an
2 Ibid., p. 812.
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editorial response on March 31, 1983, the first editorial
collected for the U.S. public opinion data set. Almost all
of the debate in these two data sets, however, occured
after October 25, 1983. The Congressional remarks data set
begins on October 25, 1983 and continues through November 4,
1983.
The time period for the Grenada case study is much
briefer than the next two case studies, Panama and Haiti.
Prior to and during the invasion of Grenada, the United
States was preoccupied with the multinational peacekeeping
mission in Lebanon. On October 23, 1983, two days prior to
Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada, over 200 U.S. Marines were
killed in Beirut during a suicidal bomb attack by a Lebanese
terrorist. Neither Congress nor the American public
anticipated President Reagan's decision to divert forces to
the Caribbean. The national debate, therefore, did not
commence in full force until the ten days following the
landing of troops. For the purposes of this thesis this
time period is referred to as the Post Invasion Period
(PIP)
•
Figure 2.1 depicts the number of editorials,
Congressional remarks, and Presidential remarks with regard
to the Grenada invasion from March 21, 1983 through November
33
4, 1983 for the respective data sets. The completed data
base, using all three sources, included 116 units of
analysis comprised of 45 editorials, 115 Senate and House
remarks, and 9 Presidential addresses, remarks, and press
conferences
.
The debates within the public, Congressional and
Presidential arenas are examined separately. Each section
contains an overview of the basic arguments surrounding the
invasion, followed by a discussion of the main themes and
secondary themes that emerged during the debate. The
analysis does not include changes in rhetoric over time.
Due to the Brief time span, such changes did not prove
significant. Throughout the remainder of this chapter, all
dates refer to the year 1983, unless otherwise noted.
C. THE U.S. PUBLIC ON GRENADA
The data set for public opinion contains one editorial
dated March 31, one week following the President's speech on
Soviet expansion. Grenada was not mentioned again in the
editorials until 21 October, and the concern was still
limited to perceived Soviet threat. Fifty- two percent of
the editorials (24 of 45) were printed during the two days
immediately following the invasion, 26 and 27 October.
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Public opinion was divided over the invasion. Fifty-
one percent (23 of 45) supported the President's decision,
40 percent (18 of 45) opposed the invasion, and nine percent
(4 of 45) voiced no opinion about the invasion at all, but
focused only on the Soviet threat. Concerning the latter
category, it should be noted three of the four editorials
were printed prior to 25 October, when thoughts of military
action in the Caribbean were far from the public mind.
Four main themes emerged in the public editorials: a)
safeguarding U.S. citizens; b) curbing Soviet expansion; c)
negativism toward U.S. imperialism; and d) the question of
legality.
Those in favor of the intervention were primarily
concerned with safeguarding U.S. citizens and countering the
Soviet threat (see Figure 2.2). Forty percent (9 of 23)
focused on protecting the U.S. medical students as a main
theme, and 60 percent (14 of 23) mentioned the concern as a
subtheme. The other major concern was the potential
Communist threat. Forty percent (9 of 23) of the editorials
cited Soviet expansion and Cuban influence as a main theme,
and 74 percent (17 of 23) mentioned it as a secondary theme.
The remaining 20 percent of the pro-invasion editorials were
concerned with liberating the oppressed Grenadians and
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responding to the call for assistance from the Organization
of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) . Aiding the OECS also
appeared as a subtheme in 48 percent (11 of 23) of those
editorials
.
Those opposed to the President's decision focused on
U.S. imperialism. They compared the U.S. invasion of
jieaada Lj the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and
criticized irhe gunboat diplomacy characteristic of U.S.
foreign policy. U.S. imperialism was the main theme of 67
pe .Merit (12 of 18) of these editorials. The same 67 percent
of the editorials refused to believe that there was a real
clanger to the U.S. medical students on the island. A
secondary theme citing no real threat to U.S. citizens was
found in each of the editorials criticizing U.S.
imperialism. An additional criticism was that the United
States had violated international law. Seventeen percent (3
of 18) referred to violations of OAS treaties as a main
theme and 50 percent (9 of 18) referred to such infractions
as a secondary theme.
Some subthemes appeared in both pro- and anti-invasion
editorials (see Figure 2.3). One recurring subtheme focused
on the negative response of the other World leaders. Sixty-
one percent (11 of 18) of editorials opposing U.S. action
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stated that the United States had alienated its allies over
the Grenada invasion. Thirteen percent (3 of 23) of those
in favor of the invasion also noted the negative stance of
U.S. allies but were not concerned. Rather, they were
adamant that the United States would act to protect its
citizens and interests regardless of world opinion. With
regard to Communist threat, 51 percent (23 of 45) of all
editorials were concerned about the Soviet buildup and Cuban
influence as a secondary theme. Even those opposed to the
invasion acknowledged the threat, they just did not believe
it was sufficient to justify invading Grenada. Twenty
percent (9 of 45) of all editorials also voiced a concern
for U.S. troops and casualties as a subtheme. This was no
doubt influenced by the deaths of 200 U.S. Marines in
Lebanon on October 23. The United States was now involved
on a second front and the public wanted troops brought home
quickly.
D. THE U.S. CONGRESS ON GRENADA
The majority of Congress was in favor of the invasion,
though they resented not being consulted first. Fifty-six
percent (64 of 115) supported the President's decision, 31
percent (36 of 115) opposed the invasion, and 13 percent (15
of 115) voiced no opinion on the invasion at all but instead
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focused on procedures and how to invoke the War Powers
Resolution as quickly as possible.
As in the public editorials, those members of Congress
who supported the deployment of U.S. troops did so to
protect the U.S. medical students and to curb Soviet
expansionism (see Figure 2.4). Rescuing American citizens
was mentioned as a main theme in 50 percent (32 of 64) and
as a subtheme in 68 percent (44 of 64) of the pro-invasion
Congressional remarks. The Communist threat was a matter of
concern in 27 percent (17 of 64) of the remarks as a main
theme and 56 percent (36 of 64) as a secondary theme.
Coming to the aid of the OECS was the main theme of 13
percent (8 of 64) of the remarks and was a subtheme of 27
percent (17 of 64) . An additional topic mentioned
significantly as a subtheme was the promotion of democracy.
Sixteen percent (10 of 64) discussed the promotion of
democracy; however, it was mentioned only by those who
supported the invasion. The remainder of remarks did not
discuss the issue at all.
Of the Congressional remarks opposed to the invasion,
53 percent (19 of 36) criticized U.S. imperialism. As with
the public, most of these remarks (14 of 36) claimed that
U.S. citizens were in no real danger. The remainder of the
opposition remarks were more or less equally divided between
concern for casualties, legal issues, and the War Powers Act
(see Figure 2.5) . Many congressional remarks cited
violations to international law, specifically OAS treaties,
as well as infractions to procedures outlined in the U.S.
Constitution. The illegality of the invasion was a main
theme in 14 percent (5 of 36) and a subtheme in 36 percent
(12 of 36) of the remarks.
Additional subthemes mentioned only by those opposed to
the invasion included negative world opinion, ineffective
diplomacy and a decline in credibility. Negative world
opinion was mentioned as a subtheme by twenty-five percent
(9 of 36), who criticized the United States for alienating
Great Britain and other allies over Grenada. Nineteen
percent (7 of 36) said the United States would not have had
to invade Grenada if President Reagan had met with Prime
Minister Bishop earlier in the year when Bishop had tried to
mend his relationship with the United States (see Appendix
A). Finally, 17 percent (6 of 36) thought the invasion had
resulted in a decline in U.S. credibility both with European
allies and in' the region.
Unlike the public, which was concerned about Soviet
expansion regardless of how they felt about the invasion, in
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Congress only those who supported the invasion commented on
the Communist threat. Though Communism represented the
second highest concern in pro-invasion discussion, the
Soviets and Cubans were mentioned only once as a main theme
and three times as a subtheme in the remainder of the
remarks
.
The War Powers Act, on the other hand, was an issue
that cut across all stances on the invasion. It concerned
the whole of Congress for several reasons. Many members
focused on legal procedures and U.S. Constitutional issues,
including when and how the President is authorized to deploy
U.S. troops and verbiage of proposed amendments. Others
members were concerned about bringing troops home as quickly
as possible (see Figure 2.5).
E. THE PRESIDENT ON GRENADA
President Reagan began warning the United States of
Soviet expansion in Grenada in the spring of 1983. In
March, he showed photos of the Soviet-sponsored airport
under construction, and in April he again discussed the
strategic significance of that airport as a jumping off
point for the Soviets. 3 He did not mention Grenada to the
3Weekly Compilation of Presidential Remarks , March and April
1983, pp. 442, 642.
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public or press again, however, until troops had been
deployed and the invasion had begun. At that point his
primary concern was for the U.S. citizens on the island.
The Soviet buildup was mentioned only once after the
invasion. Figure 2.6 illustrates the President's dual
concerns regarding the invasion.
Operation Urgent Fury was a rescue mission, according
to the President. The United States was responding to a
threat to the safety of the U.S. medical students at St.
Georges University Medical School who were being prevented
from leaving the island and who might be shot if they
violated General Austin's curfew. Reagan also mentioned (4
times out of 9) as a secondary issue that the United States
was aiding the OECS (see Figure 2.7). He never addressed
the position of Great Britain or other European powers, but
insisted that the United States was responding to a call
from its Caribbean neighbors.
Democracy was not mentioned by the President until
November, and then it was only mentioned twice and always in
conjunction with liberating the oppressed people of Grenada.
Clearly it was not a key issue (see Figure 2.7) . As for the
U.S. military, however, President Reagan ardently praised
the performance of the Marines and Rangers in every address
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and press conference following the invasion. Possibly due
to the Beirut bombing that killed 200 marines 23 October, as
well as to pressure from Congress regarding the War Powers
Resolution, he began discussing bringing troops home as
aarly as 3 November--nine days after the invasion.
F. CONCLUSION
Because President Reagan surprised the U.S. Congress
and the public with the invasion of Grenada, the time period
for the Grenada data set was primarily limited to the Post
Invasion Period (PIP) . Rhetoric surrounding the events
leading to the invasion was unavailable, if not nonexistent.
The limited time span might have skewed the impression of
support for the invasion because the PIP has typically been
a period of increased support for the President and his
decision to deploy troops. Given the "rally around the
flag" phenomenon, it is interesting to note that though the
majority of the country appeared to support the invasion,
the margin of that majority was small (51 percent of public
editorials and 56 percent of Congressional remarks) . Two
factors could have contributed to the persistent
divisiveness : a) lack of time for the public to fully
comprehend the situation in Grenada and raise issues of
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concern prior to the invasion; or b) external variables such
as the simultaneous operation in Lebanon.
Though President Reagan began by warning against Soviet
expansionism in the Caribbean, by the time he deployed U.S.
troops to Grenada he was only talking about rescuing U.S.
citizens. In case he needed further justification, he was
responding to a request from the OECS, the United States'
Caribbean neighbors.
Congress and the U.S. public also believed the Unites
States should protect its citizens—if the citizens were
actually in danger. Those who supported the invasion
believed the medical students were at risk of being held
hostage or shot, those who opposed the invasion believed
there was no real danger to the students. Though not
specifically mentioned in any of the data sets, the Iranian
hostage crisis of 1979 through 1981 probably contributed to
concern for U.S. residents in Grenada. Congressman Robert
G. Toricelli (D, NJ) told press reporters on November 11,
1983 that "years of frustration were vented by the Grenada
invasion. I hardly get a call where people don't mention
the Iranian hostage situation." 4
4 Facts on File , November 11, 1983, p. 857
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As for the Communist threat, the public was torn
between their fear of the Soviets and their fear of becoming
like those they hated. They did not want the Soviets and
Cubans gaining influence or strategic advantage in the
United States' backyard, and all, acknowledged that this was
a real possibility. But they did not want the United States
to condemn Soviet behavior in Afghanistan and then conduct
Soviet style operations in the Caribbean. Those who
perceived U.S. actions as defensive and as a rescue mission
supported the invasion, those who perceived U.S. action as
offensive and imperialistic opposed the invasion.
The issue of allies, whether Caribbean or European, was
secondary and subject to manipulation. Those who supported
the invasion said the United States was aiding the OECS
.
Those who opposed the invasion did not mention the OECS but
said the United States had alienated its closest allies.
Though Great Britain, France, Canada, and West Germany were
mentioned by name, the United Nations (U.N.) and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were never discussed.
When those opposed to the invasion cited infractions of
international law, they referred to OAS treaties, not U.N.
agreements. On the rare occasion that public editorials or
Congressional remarks supporting the invasion mentioned the
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negative opinion of U.S. allies, they expressed disgust at
the lack of support for the United States, particularly on
the part of Great Britain. The United States was going to
protect its citizens and its interests regardless of the
opinions of lesser powers.
For the United States, the Cold War as depicted through
the U.S. invasion of Grenada was a time to a) protect
American citizens; b) guard against Soviet expansion; and c)
be prepared to act unilaterally to accomplish the former.
Allies and legality with regard to international and
domestic procedures were secondary and all other issues were
even more insignificant.
The following chapter will reveal changes that occurred
in the national rhetoric as the United States no longer
faced a familiar enemy. By 1989, the Soviet Union had begun
its transition into the Combined Independent States (CIS)
,
taking with it an aspect of the U.S. national identity. Who
was the United States if not a defender against the evils of
Communism?
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III. PANAMA: OPERATION JUST CAUSE
During the invasion of Grenada, both the national
identity of the United States and the U.S. approach to
intervention was driven by a perceived monolithic Soviet
threat. During the late 1980 's, however, the Soviet Union
was weakening as a great unilateral power. The United
States, no longer faced with a serious Communist threat,
looked elsewhere to define foreign policy priorities, and
found the answers in modifications of familiar themes.
This chapter illustrates U.S. national rhetoric during
the critical transition period between the Cold War and the
post Cold War era. During the invasion of Panama, the U.S.
fear and hatred of the Soviet Union was recast as the hatred
of a single man, General Manuel Antonio Noriega. General
Noriega was threatening the lives of U.S. citizens
indirectly through drug trafficking and directly through
physical assault on those living in Panama. No longer faced
with a great unilateral opponent, the United States
initially showed signs of reluctance to act unilaterally.
Before authorizing the unilateral invasion of Panama,
President Bush had to convince the American public and
Congress that a) a brutal dictator was threatening the lives
of U.S. citizens; and b) the United States was the only
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power capable of removing this dictator and the threat he
posed to freedom, justice, and the American way of life.
A. THE INVASION
It is possible the Panama crisis was born on June 6,
1987 when Colonel Roberto Diaz Herrera, the former Chief of
Staff of the Panama Defense Forces (PDF) , held a press
conference following his forced retirement. The Colonel
accused General Manuel Antonio Noriega of rigging the 1984
presidential elections, murdering a Panamanian activist,
planting a bomb on former president Omar Torrijos' plane,
and many other devious crimes. For the first time, the
Panamanian public was made aware of conflict within the
PDF. 1
It was not until early 1988 that the conflict became an
interstate contest between the United States and Panama. In
February 1988, two U.S. Grand Juries in Miami and Tampa,
Florida indicted Noriega on charges of drug trafficking.
From that point the animosity between the United States and
Noriega escalated until December 1989 when Noriega declared
Panama to be in a state of war against the United States.
The Panama Defense Forces subsequently harassed U.S. service
x John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing
the Restoration of Panama
,
(Carlisle Barracks, Penn: Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992), p. 1.
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members, interrogated and beat a U.S. Navy lieutenant and
his wife, and killed a U.S. Marine lieutenant. President
George Bush responded to these attacks by ordering U.S.
troops into Panama on December 19, 1989 to "protect the
lives of American citizens in Panama and to bring General
Noriega to justice in the United States." 2
While examining U.S. rhetoric surrounding the Panama
invasion, this chapter notes a significant recurrence of
anti-Noriega sentiment and a noticeable decline in
preference for multilateral action over unilateral U.S.
response. Before examining rhetorical themes in the U.S.
public, Congressional and Presidential debates I will
explain the case study's research design.
B. RESEARCH DESIGN
The time period examined in this case study extends
from April 1, 1989 through December 21, 1989 for the public
and President data sets. Though tensions between Noriega
and the U.S. government had been growing since 1988,
discussion of possible U.S. responses beyond economic
sanctions commenced only as the May 7, 1989 Panamanian
presidential election drew near. April 27, 1989 marks the
President George Bush's Address to the Nation announcing
U.S. military action in Panama, December 20, 1989, Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents , 1989, p. 1974.
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first statement by President Bush concerning the U.S.
position regarding the impending election. The first
editorial of the year representing public opinion about
Noriega and Panama was printed in the New York Times April
25, 1989. Because the U.S. military invasion occurred on
December 19, 1989, the Post Invasion Period (PIP) for the
President and public data sets is represented by information
dated December 19, 1989 through December 21, 1989.
The time period for data collection within the Congress
data set differs slightly because Congress was not in
session during the U.S. invasion in Panama. Thus the time
period extends from April 1, 1989 through January 30, 1990,
when Congress provided their initial feedback on the
invasion. The PIP for the Congress data set includes
remarks (seven, in total) made in the Senate and the House
from January 23, 1990 through January 30, 1990. Following
January 1990, congressional discussion turned to other
issues and only briefly returned to the invasion when
considering when to withdraw U.S. troops.
Figure 3.1 depicts the number of editorials,
Congressional remarks and Presidential remarks concerning
the Panama invasion from April 1, 1989 through the PIP for
the respective data sets. The completed data base, using
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all three sources, included 263 units of analysis consisting
of 134 editorials, 117 Senate and House remarks, and 12
Presidential addresses, remarks and news conferences.
The debates within the public, Congressional, and
Presidential arenas are examined separately. Each section
begins with an overview of the basic arguments surrounding
the invasion. This overview does not include analysis of
changes in rhetoric over time. It extracts the dominant
ideas from the entire nine month period preceding the
dispatch of troops as well as the initial feedback
representative of the day of invasion (PIP) . In each
section, following the overview, the main themes and
secondary themes are discussed. Throughout the remainder of
this chapter, all dates refer to the year 1989, unless
otherwise noted.
C. THE U.S. PUBLIC ON PANAMA
The majority of the U.S. public was opposed to the
invasion of Panama throughout the preceding months (see
Figure 3.2) . In May, 51 percent (26 of 51) opposed U.S.
military action, followed by 40 percent (4 of 10) opposition
in September, and 53 percent (19 of 36) opposition in
October. Not until the PIP did the public support U.S.
military action, when 88 percent of all editorials (15 of
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17) responded in favor of President Bush's decision to send
in troops.
Before the invasion, over 50 percent (26 of 50) of
opposing opinion focused on a preference for multinational
action over unilateral U.S. response (see Figure 3.3).
Support for a combined multinational response gradually
decreased, however, and on December 21, the majority (15 of
17) of the news editorials favored unilateral action by the
United States to safeguard U.S. citizens.
Three main themes emerged in the public editorials: a)
strong anti-Noriega sentiment; b) support for multilateral
response; and c) debate surrounding the October coup
attempt. The emphasis place on these themes shifted between
May, when public dialog on Panama commenced, and the PIP,
when the dialog was nearing completion (see Figure 3.4). In
May, the primary focus was on multilateralism and anti-
Noriega sentiment. Following the invasion, however, the
emphasis was on safeguarding U.S. citizens.
From May through December strong anti-Noriega sentiment
flooded the editorials (see Figure 3.5) . In May, after
Noriega stole the elections, the U.S. public was convinced
that Noriega was a villain and that the Organization of
American States (OAS) and the global community should take
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action against him. In May, Anti-Noriega sentiment
represented 27 percent (14 of 51) of main themes and 63
percent (32 of 51) of subthemes. In September, it
represented 30 percent (3 of 10) of main themes and 90
percent (9 of 10) of subthemes. In October, it represented
12 percent (4 of 36) of main themes and 33 percent (12 of
36) of subthemes. Following the invasion, it represented 12
percent (2 of 17) of main themes and 77 percent (13 of 17)
of subthemes. The relatively low number of references as a
main theme in October and during the PIP was because the
public had shifted focus to the coup and American citizens
living in Panama.
Interest in Panama waned June through September until
the coup attempt October 3, 1989 (see Figure 3.1). The coup
participants had expected U.S. assistance but President Bush
refrained from ordering U.S. troops stationed in Panama to
participate. Only 10 percent (12 of 117) of the public
disagreed with the president's decision in the editorials.
Twenty-one percent (25 of 117) of the editorials applauded
the president's decision and 69 percent (80 of 117) focused
on the necessity for a unified policy without taking a
stance on the coup at all.
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In November, Panama again disappeared from the
editorials and did not appear again until December 21, 1989;
at which time, the public overwhelmingly supported the U.S.
invasion to protect the lives of U.S. citizens (see Figure
3.1 and Figure 3.2). U.S. citizens, not even mentioned
prior to the PIP, appeared as a main theme in 53 percent (9
of 17) of the editorials that day. Democracy and the Panama
Canal were not issues in the public mind. Even drug
trafficking was not an issue of concern; it was mentioned
only in a long list of Noriega's character flaws.
Significant trends in the sub-themes included a steady
decline in support for multinational response (see Figure
3.3) . In May, 67 percent (34 of 51) of the news editorials
supported multinational response over unilateral action by
the United States. By September this support had declined
to 30 percent (3 of 10) of editorials. In fact, 20 percent
(2 of 10) of the editorials voiced the opinion that
multinational institutions (i.e., the OAS, the U.N. was not
mentioned) were ineffective and the United States should
think about other options. By October, only 22 percent (8
of 36) of the editorials supported multinational response.
During the PIP, only 18 percent (3 of 17) editorials
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maintained that a multinational response would have been
preferable to U.S. action.
As a subtheme in October, after the coup, the public
was concerned about clear U.S. policy and unified government
departments working as a team to prepare for a response to
the Panama situation. Thirty percent (12 of 36) of
editorials in October were concerned about a unified policy
as a subtheme.
As a subtheme the Panama Canal was always present in
the back of the public minds. While they were spewing
criticisms of Noriega's character and the terrible things he
was doing in Panama, somewhere in the editorials was a
feeling of "oh yes, the Canal, the United States needs to
watch out for that..." The Canal was consistently present
as a subtheme in approximately 25-30 percent of all
editorials regardless of month or date.
Unlike the Haiti intervention, during the Panama
invasion, editorials were not greatly concerned about U.S.
credibility with the global community, democracy, or vaguely
defined national interests (except the specific mention of
the Panama Canal) . The American public hated Noriega and
though they initially preferred that the global community
handle the affair, when the OAS proved ineffective and
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Noriega started harming U.S. citizens they dismissed
multilateral action and said, "The United States looks out
for its own people...," "Somebody should take care of
Noriega..." "...and then there is the canal to think
about. . ." 3
D. THE U.S. CONGRESS ON PANAMA
From the time the Panama crisis was first mentioned in
Congress in May through the initial feedback on the invasion
in January 1990, the majority of the House and Senate
refrained from making a pro/con statement regarding U.S.
military action. Out of 134 remarks, 82 percent voiced no
opinion on the possibility of U.S. invasion. Of the 12
percent (16 of 134) who favored the invasion, the main
reason was that Noriega was a villain. The remaining 6
percent (8 of 134) opposition was due to support for
multinational response. Discussion was bipartisan and
equally represented in the House and the Senate.
Congress, like the public, primarily focused on the
nefarious characteristics of Noriega. Anti-Noriega
sentiment amounted to 28 percent of all main themes for the
duration of the data collected. There was, however, a
Editorials on File , Vol. 20, No. 24, December 16-31, 1989,
pp. 1475-1481.
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decline in Congressional interest in Noriega's finer
qualities (see Figure 3.6) . From May through June, anti-
Noriega sentiment represented 32 percent (23 of 73) of the
main themes and 62 percent (45 of 73) of the subthemes; in
October, 24 percent (11 of 45) of the main themes and 40
percent (18 of 45) of the subthemes; and by the PIP anti-
Noriega sentiment was reduced to only 14 percent (1 of 7) of
all main themes and 28 percent (2 of 7) subthemes of
Congressional remarks.
In May, Congressional focus was on Panama's elections
and being prepared for Noriega to steal them. During this
time and immediately following in June, they espoused
democracy as a main theme in approximately 26 percent of the
remarks for those two months (see Figure 3.7). Later,
however, they rarely mentioned it. As a subtheme, a similar
pattern occurred. Democracy was a subtheme of 45 percent
(25 of 56) of May remarks. By October, however, it was only
evident in 7 percent (3 of 45) of the remarks.
The Panama Canal accounted for approximately 13 percent
of all main themes from May through the PIP. It was
consistently present as an issue though never prominent as a
main theme. As a subtheme the Canal was mentioned in 41
percent (23 of 55) of the remarks in May but only in 16
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percent (7 of 45) of the remarks in October. Concern for
the security of the Canal apparently declined over time.
As with the public, Congress appeared to lose faith in
the effectiveness of a global response and the OAS '
s
abilities to cope with Noriega and the Panama crisis.
Support for multinational response was present in 21 percent
(13 of 56) of Congressional remarks in May as a main theme
but was only mentioned three times in the following months.
As a subtheme, approximately 37 percent (21 of 56) of
Congressional remarks voiced support for multinational
action in May, but this support had declined to
approximately 5 percent (2 of 45) of remarks in October.
In October, following the coup attempt, the Senate was
preoccupied with procedural issues and ensuring the
president had the authority to involve U.S. troops in Panama
should that be his decision in the future (see Figure 3.8).
Amendments were drafted and debated. Procedures for
deploying troops and approving Canal authorities were the
focus of approximately 25 percent (11 of 45) of all remarks
in October, though they were never mentioned previously and
only once following October. Concern over a unified policy
also emerged in October as a subtheme. Approximately 29
percent (13 of 45) of October's remarks stated that the
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government agencies needed to work together to articulate a
clear policy for the U.S. toward Panama and Noriega.
Response to the coup attempt in October was divided.
Approximately 38 percent (17 of 45) of the remarks stated
the U.S. should have supported the coup with military
reenforcement . Twenty-seven percent supported President
Bush's decision not to involve the United States in the
coup. Stances on the coup transcended party lines.
An unexpected subtheme that emerged was the concern
over the Communist threat. May through July, Soviet
response and threat from Communism was mentioned in 11
percent (8 of 74) of Congressional remarks. It was never
mentioned after July. In 1989, the Soviet Union was
declining in status as a superpower and the Cold War was
coming to an end. Congressional concern over the Soviet
Union early in the Panama crisis was seemingly reflexive and
reminiscent of a previous mind set. The fact that concern
over the Soviet Union did not emerge at all during the Haiti
Intervention indicates that Congress ultimately evolved from
the Cold War mind set.
Unlike the news editorials in during the Panama
invasion, Congressional remarks commented on drug
trafficking as an issue separate from Noriega's character.
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Still, it was not a key issue. Drug trafficking was only
mentioned as a main theme in 6 percent (8 of 134) of
Congressional remarks, and as a subtheme in 11 percent (15
of 134) of remarks.
On the whole, Congress, like the American public, had
an aversion to Noriega, and wanted him out of Panama.
Democracy and multinational responsibility were key issues
initially (in May), but by October they were rarely
mentioned. Congress was focused on U.S. foreign policy
toward Panama and procedural concerns in October, though
they still thought Noriega was a vile criminal. As a whole
they refrained from opinions on whether the United States
should invade Panama. Congress was not even in session when
President Bush made that decision. In January 1990, when
they had their first chance to respond to the invasion, four
remarks supported the invasion, two remarks were opposed,
and one remark abstained from an opinion, simply commending
the performance of the U.S. military members while carrying
out their orders.
E. THE PRESIDENT ON PANAMA
On the morning following the invasion of Panama,
President Bush stated the goals of the United States toward
Panama had consistently been to safeguard the lives of
64
American citizens, defend democracy, combat drug
trafficking, and protect the Panama Canal. The invasion was
actually initiated, he said, in response to Noriega's
attacks on U.S. citizens in Panama. He said that the United
States would continue to seek answers to problems in the
region through multilateral diplomacy, but in this instance
diplomacy had failed. This address, delivered on the
morning of December 20, 1989, was the first time the
President commented on the use of military force to
intervene in Panama.
The main themes of the President's remarks changed
through the months preceding the invasion. In April and
May, he talked about the importance of democracy, and the
position of the United States toward the stolen elections.
In June, he espoused the merits of the OAS and multilateral
response. In August and September, he condemned Noriega.
In October, he mentioned safeguarding U.S. citizens and
democracy, and on the day of the invasion, he spoke of his
concern for American lives.
Though the main themes shifted through the months, the
subthemes in President Bush's remarks were very consistent.
Democracy was mentioned as a main theme only in April and
May, but as a subtheme it was present in 83 percent (10 of
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12) of presidential statements— all but two press
conferences in October. Safeguarding U.S. citizens did not
appear as a main theme until October, but it was mentioned
as a subtheme in 50 percent (6 of 12) of Presidential
statements, beginning in May. Anti-Noriega sentiment was a
main theme of President Bush in May, September, and August,
and was a subtheme in 50 percent of his remarks.
The President actually said very little about Panama.
He commented on the crisis to the press and the public on
average only once a month. The exceptions were during May
and October, when the Press repeatedly asked about the
elections and the coup, respectively. During May there were
three sessions concerning Panama and during October there
were four. The possibility of U.S. invasion, however, was
never mentioned. The President did not focus on drugs or
the Panama Canal, and he responded to questions about the
failed coup attempt only when asked. The main focus of his
messages shifted over time from democracy to anti-Noriega
sentiment to safeguarding U.S. citizens. Yet all three
themes were consistently present in the undercurrents of his
remarks and specified goals concerning the Panama crisis.
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F. CONCLUSION
In all three realms of debate, public, Congressional
and Presidential, initial support for multilateral action
was high but declined over the months preceding the
invasion. By October, the public and policy makers of the
United States lost faith in the effectiveness of
multilateral organizations, chiefly the OAS, at handling the
Panama crisis. In the end, the United States took the
matter into its own hands.
Of all the possible concerns of the United States--the
Panama Canal, drug trafficking, the spread of democracy in
the hemisphere—the main theme of the crisis was ousting the
villain Noriega. According to U.S. national rhetoric, the
proverbial last straw was Noriega's actions threatening U.S.
citizens in Panama. Concern for the Canal and the future of
the Canal Treaty was prevalent, but not prominent.
Democracy was much the same.
Congress was preoccupied with procedures and policy.
Most members refrained from taking a stance on U.S.
invasion. Congress was the only body even remotely
discussing the Soviet reaction to U.S. policy, and even they
discussed it only early in the year.
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The public was adamantly opposed to U.S. invasion and
favored a global response until President Bush ordered in
the troops. Then they rallied around the flag and
overwhelmingly supported the invasion because the United
States had to protect its citizens.
Noriega's attack on U.S. citizens was just the excuse
the President needed finally to get rid of Noriega. The OAS
could not or would not oust Noriega. Covert and diplomatic
attempts to depose him had failed, as had the October coup
by Panamanian citizens. Noriega was both an embarrassment
and a threat to the United States. So the United States
sent in additional troops, instated Endara as the duly
elected President of Panama, and proceeded to hunt down
Noriega and bring him to justice. Perhaps, if Noriega had
not attacked U.S. citizens, the United States would not have
responded with invasion. Perhaps it was only a matter of
time before the United States became intolerant of him
regardless of his threats to U.S. service members. The
fervor in the national rhetoric was due to an increasing
aversion to the man and his actions. Though as in years
past, the chief concern was safeguarding U.S. citizens, this
invasion was not strategic in nature. It was personal.
The transition period between the Cold War and the post
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Cold War era altered the American view of the Soviet Union,
the U.S. -Soviet relationship, and the U.S. national
identity. Americans were releasing their long held
paradigms about the U.S. role in the world and were
struggling to define new national interests. Though
national rhetoric initially returned to the Soviet Union,
the reaction was more reflexive than representative of a
real concern. Ultimately, the United States applied the
Cold War fear of threat to U.S. citizens and the American
way of life to General Noriega. The U.S. national identity
as the lone defender of justice in the hemisphere was
initially suppressed as the United States attempted to wait
for a multilateral removal of the dictator, but old concepts
prevailed as the United States took matters into its own
hands
.
The following chapter will reveal further changes in
the national rhetoric as the United States struggled to
further identify its new role in a world without the balance
of two opposing super powers. By 1994, the United States
had reconciled with the former Soviet Union, the new
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) . It had led the
United Nations in vanquishing Saddam Hussein in the 1991
Persian Gulf War. Again the United States faced self-
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examination. With no enemy to face, what did the United
States stand for and whom did it stand against?
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IV. HAITI: OPERATION RESTORE DEMOCRACY
During the invasion of Grenada, the U.S. approach to
intervention was driven by a perceived Soviet threat.
During the Invasion of Panama, that perceived threat was
transferred to the image of General Noriega, but the
underlying themes surrounding intervention still resembled
Cold War debates. The only novel concept introduced during
the Panama crisis was that the United States should attempt
to act in conjunction with other world organizations instead
of unilaterally- -a concept that was short-lived as the
United States ultimately took matters into its own hands.
By 1994, multilateralism had become the norm (the global
community would accept nothing else) and Americans had begun
to identify the United States as a team player. The 1991
Persian Gulf War served to enhance this national self-image
when the United States (now more pquarterbackb than plone
rangerp) led a team of U.N. forces to defeat Saddam Hussein.
This chapter illustrates national rhetoric in the post
Cold War era, when American uncertainty regarding the nature
of future conflicts and the role of the United States in the
global community pervaded U.S. foreign policy. During the
U.S. intervention in Haiti, President Clinton had to
convince the American public and Congress that a) Turmoil in
Haiti threatened U.S. national interests; b) the United
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States had a duty to defend justice and democracy throughout
the world; and c) the United States would have the
assistance and support of other governments and their
forces. In the case of Haiti, the U.S. public and Congress
never did acknowledge a threat to U.S. national interests,
and the majority of opinion opposed the intervention over
the issue. An interesting phenomenon, however, occurred
once the intervention was accomplished without any
casualties. The country supported the President's decision
regardless of national interests involved as long as no
lives were lost. National rhetoric had changed since the




On September 18, 1994, while 61 U.S. military aircraft
were en route Haiti, the country's illegitimate military
government talked with U.S. mediators and agreed to
relinquish power. In exchange for amnesty, the military
junta promised to restore the democratically elected
government of Jean Bertrand Aristide, who had been ousted by
a military coup in 1991. U.S. Forces began arriving in
Haiti on September 19, 1994 to facilitate Aristide' s return.
President Clinton announced the agreement in a televised
address from the White House a few hours after the military
76
leaders had conceded to terms outlined by a U.S. triumvirate
comprised of former President Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn
(D-Georgia) , and General Colin Powell, the former chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The way was paved for a
"peaceful" arrival of U.S. military forces and President
Clinton had fulfilled an ultimatum delivered to Haiti's de
facto government on September 15, 1994. "The message of the
United States to the Haitian dictators is clear. Your time
is up. Leave now or we will force you from power." 1
The intervention was very controversial in the United
States, following as it did on the heels of the failed
peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Neither Congress nor the
American public were prepared to risk the lives of U.S.
troops in a situation in which there was no threat to U.S.
national interests, and in another peacekeeping mission with
unclear goals. The debate surrounding the use of military
force was more emotionally and politically heated than that
surrounding the Grenada and Panama case studies.
This chapter examines the most recent case of U.S.
intervention in Latin America (Haiti in September 1994), to
identify patterns in the internal rhetoric of the U.S.
xWeekly Compilation of Presidential Documents , Vol. 30, No
37, 1994, p. 1779.
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public and policy makers. As in the previous studies, the
intent is not to prove why the United States intervened, but
to illustrate the different rhetoric used by the public and
policy makers to justify intervention in the case of Haiti.
The research design of the case study is once again laid out
prior to analysis of the key arguments surrounding the
intervention and the recurring main themes and subthemes of
the debate.
B. RESEARCH DESIGN
The time period examined in this case study extends
from February 1, 1994 through September 21, 1994. Though
Haiti reemerged several times as a U.S. foreign policy issue
following President Jean Bertrand Aristide's exile in 1991,
the country was not viewed as a potential candidate for
formal U.S. military intervention until 1994. The time
period for data collection commences February 1, 1994
because February marks the first return of Haiti to U.S.
headlines following the USS Harlan County incident in
October 1993 (see Appendix C)
.
On October 11, 1993, the USS Harlan County steamed into
Port au Prince, Haiti, carrying 193 U.S. and 25 Canadian
military trainers. Their mission was to begin implementing
the Governor's Island accord, which called for "aid in
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modernizing the armed forces of Haiti and the creation of a
new police force." 2 They were greeted by small boats
blocking their appointed berth and approximately 100 armed
thugs (allegedly backed by the military junta) , chanting "We
are going to turn this into another Somalia." 3 Despite the
public humiliation to the White House, the USS Harlan County
was ordered to withdraw. The Clinton administration not
consider an intervention of Haiti prudent at that time,
based on lessons learned from the failed peacekeeping
mission in Somalia about the difficulties involved in
extricating forces following peacekeeping operations. 4 The
public soon forgot the incident and Haiti disappeared from
the headlines until February 1994, when the United States
attempted to negotiate a peace agreement between exiled
President Aristide and the military de facto government.
From February through September, the tiny country was the
2Tom Masland, "How Did We Get Here?" Newsweek , September 26,
1994, p. 27.
3 Ibid., p. 28. Approximately one week prior, 18 U.S.
soldiers had died in Somalia; television crews filmed a mob
dragging corpses through the streets. That event led to the
withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Somalia peacekeeping mission.
The United States was not desirous of a similar occurrence in
Haiti.
4 Ibid. White House views obtained through a Newsweek
interview with White House Press Secretary, Dee Dee Meyers in
October 1993.
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object of increasing attention by the United States public
and policy makers (see Figure 4.1)
.
Figure 4.1 depicts the number of editorials,
Congressional remarks, and Presidential remarks from
February 1, 1994 through the Post Intervention Period (PIP),
September 21 of the same year. The completed data base,
using all three sources, included 240 units of analysis
comprised of 140 editorials, 185 Senate and House remarks,
and 15 Presidential addresses, remarks and news conferences.
U.S. troops began landing on Haitian soil on September
19, 1994, therefore September 19-21, 1994 is referred to as
the Post Intervention Period (PIP) for the purpose of
examination of the rhetoric in this case study. By
September 21, 1994 most military forces had arrived and the
U.S. public and policy makers provided initial feedback on
the intervention through editorials and congressional
debates. Throughout the remainder of this chapter all dates
refer to the year 1994, unless otherwise noted.
Prior to discussion of the themes found in the debate
is an overview of the basic arguments surrounding the
intervention. The overview does not include analysis of
changes in rhetoric over time, but extracts the dominant
ideas from the entire time studied. Changes in debate are
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examined in detail during the discussion of main and
secondary themes. The rhetoric of the U.S. public and
policy makers was divided as to whether the "peaceful"
deployment of troops in Haiti constituted an "invasion" or
"intervention." Given the peaceful nature of the military
deployment, I prefer the term "intervention" for this case
study.
The Haiti intervention appeared more difficult to
justify than the previous two case studies in that the
issues discussed preceding the Haiti intervention were both
more plentiful and more ambiguous. Eight main themes
emerged to frame the debate surrounding the intervention:
national interests, democracy, credibility, refugees,
sanctions, human rights, politics, and casualties.
C. THE U.S. PUBLIC ON HAITI
As with the U.S. invasion of Panama, the majority of
editorials adamantly opposed U.S. military action in Haiti
throughout the months preceding the intervention (see Figure
4.2). The first editorials appeared in February, but the
notion of intervention was not broached by the American
public until May, when the United Nations broadened
sanctions and President Clinton initiated at-sea interviews
for fleeing refugees. In May, most editorials still
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discussed the issues surrounding Haiti— sanctions and
refugees—without mentioning intervention at all. Only 23
percent (5 of 22) of editorials considered intervention a
viable option; 35 percent (7 of 22) were opposed to the
idea. By July, when U.S. forces began work-ups for
potential operations in Haiti, 67 percent (16 of 24) of the
editorials spoke out in opposition to intervention.
Opposition continued through mid-September, when 50 percent
(11 of 22) of the editorials maintained staunch opposition
to deploying U.S. forces. Then, during the PIP, as news of
the intervention flooded the networks, the public rallied
behind the President; and 66 percent (19 of 29) of the
editorials applauded the "bloodless" intervention.
Those opposed to the intervention primarily insisted
the national interests of the United States were not
threatened by turmoil in Haiti, therefore intervention was
unwarranted (see Figure 4.3). The lack of U.S. national
interests at stake constituted 47 percent (29 of 62) of the
main themes and 50 percent (31 of 62) of the subthemes in
editorials opposing the intervention. An additional 16
percent (10 of 62) of the public opposed such action on the
grounds that President Clinton was merely trying to improve
his political standing, and that was not a sufficient reason
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for deploying U.S. troops. U.S. credibility in the region
and the problems created by the influx of refugees were also
cited as insufficient reasons to intervene.
Most of the editorials in favor of the intervention
appeared after troops had landed and no casualties had been
incurred. Thirty-one percent (16 of 51) of all pro-
intervention editorials were in favor of the intervention
because it was "bloodless" (see Figure 4.3). An additional
31 percent (16 of 51) supported the intervention to preserve
the credibility of the U.S. role as hegemonic power in the
western hemisphere. They worried that "tin horn" dictators
and other world powers were not taking the United States
seriously because of waffling U.S. policies. As a subtheme,
credibility was mentioned by 65 percent (33 of 51) of pro-
intervention editorials, 37 percent (23 of 62) of anti-
intervention editorials and 26 percent (7 of 27) of those
who had no opinion on whether the United States should
intervene but were still concerned with the U.S. image in
the world community. Twelve percent (6 of 51) of supporters
for the intervention said that the sanctions imposed by the
United States and world community had failed and they
favored intervention as the last resort.
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Three lesser themes emerged in pro-intervention and
anti-intervention editorials: a) democracy; b) refugees; and
c) human rights. Democracy was mentioned by 8 percent (4 of
51) of supporters as a main theme and by 31 percent (16 of
51) as a subtheme. Supporters of the intervention were in
favor of "restoring" democracy that had been stolen from the
Haitians by a brutal dictator. Democracy was mentioned as a
main theme by 6 percent (4 of 62) and as a subtheme by 24
percent (15 of 62) of those opposed to the intervention on
the grounds that democracy could not successfully be imposed
on another sovereign state. They cited Haiti's long history
of authoritarian regimes implying that Haiti had never known
"true" democracy.
Refugees were also mentioned by pro-intervention and
anti-intervention editorials usually cued by a change in the
President's refugee policy. In May, President Clinton
announced that for the first time, the United States would
no longer directly return the "boat people, " but would
process them at sea, offering asylum to victims of political
repression. But the White House grossly underestimated the
number of Haitians who would set out to sea in response to
the policy change. Instead of the 2,000 a week they had
predicted, the U.S. Coast Guard by late June and early July
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was rescuing between 2,000 and 3,000 a day while additional
hundreds drowned. 5 The U.S. public, particularly residents
of Florida were concerned and divided on the refugee issue.
Eight percent (4 of 51) of news editorials favoring
intervention argued that military action was necessary to
halt the flood of refugees into Florida. Almost 10 percent
(6 of 62) of those opposed to the intervention argued that
the U.S. refugee policy needed to be altered to provide for
Haitians. They said the U.S. policy discriminated against
blacks--after all, the United States was not invading Cuba
to keep Hispanic refugees from reaching U.S. shores.
Human rights, like refugees, were not a major concern
expressed in news editorials. Safeguarding human rights
provided a justification for intervention for 8 percent (4
of 51) of supporters as a main theme and 43 percent (22 of
51) as a subtheme. Those who refrained from judgement on
whether the United States should intervene expressed concern
over human rights violations in 9 percent (2 of 27) of main
themes and 33 percent (9 of 27) of subthemes. Opposition to




D. GALLUP POLLS ON HAITI
Unlike the previous case studies, several public
opinion polls were taken prior to the Haiti intervention.
Strictly for commentary, I compared the Gallup polls with
the news editorials from the data set. There were a few
discrepancies due to the phrasing of the questions and the
specific responses allowed in the Gallup Polls (see Appendix
D) but the results were fairly consistent. As in the
editorials, the polls found that most of the public was
opposed to the intervention. Telephone interviews conducted
14-15 July indicated that even if diplomatic efforts and
sanctions failed to restore a democratic government in
Haiti, only 11 percent of Americans thought the United
States should deploy troops. By subsequently rephrasing the
question, however, the Gallup poll determined that if other
countries were involved, 54 percent of the public would
favor sending U.S. troops as part of a multi-national
coalition. The remaining 4 6 percent were opposed to sending
troops regardless of who else was involved.
Two months later, 14-15 September, Gallup again
conducted telephone interviews prior to and immediately
following President Clinton's address on 15 September. In
that sample group (phoned twice) , support for sending troops
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as part of a multinational coalition jumped from 40 percent
prior to the President's speech to 56 percent following the
address. Conversely, opposition to sending the troops
dropped from 4 9 percent before the Presidential address to
43 percent following the address. Though support for the
intervention had increased, more than four in ten viewers
remained unconvinced the United States should take military
action in Haiti.
The difference between the news editorials and public
opinion polls lay not in the reasons behind opposition and
support, but in the emphasis placed on those themes. The
Gallup Poll determined that, of the reasons cited in the
president's 15 September address, the public supporters of
the intervention found three most persuasive: a) human
rights; b) refugees; and c) democracy (see Appendix D) . The
news editorials supporting the intervention, however, were
more concerned with U.S. credibility and only mentioned the
above themes as less important concerns. Fifty-eight
percent of the respondents in the Gallup Poll expressed
skepticism about the President's motives for deploying
troops and thought at least one of his reasons was to
improve his own political standing. Similar themes were
found in the editorials.
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The Gallup Poll results indicated the same trend of
opposition to the intervention as the news editorials.
Though the 43 percent opposed to military action reflected
in the Gallup Poll was slightly lower than the 50 percent
indicated by the news editorials, the gap between the Gallup
Poll and the news editorials is misleading because the
3allup Poll stipulated an option of multilateral military
action. The gap could also be increased by the propensity
of individuals to submit editorials in opposition to issues
more often than to support them. A consensus in silence,
however, is difficult to gauge, and the similarities between
the Gallup Poll results and the news editorials reinforces
the validity of news editorials as a reliable data set for
social constructionist purposes.
E. THE U.S. CONGRESS ON HAITI
In the realm of policy makers, support for intervention
was divided along party lines. Eighty-three percent (112 of
135) of the Republicans' remarks were spoken in opposition
to the intervention and 17 percent (23 of 135) voiced no
opinion on whether the United States should intervene. Of
the Democrats' remarks, 24 percent (12 of 50) were in favor
of intervention, 30 percent (15 of 50) were opposed and 46
percent (23 of 50) voiced no opinion on the floor (see
Figure 4.4).
Congressional members supporting the intervention
claimed the United States had a duty to restore the stolen
democracy in Haiti. Restoration of democracy was the focus
of 50 percent (6 of 12) of the pro-intervention remarks as a
main theme (see Figure 4.5). Thirty-three percent (4 of
12) of pro-intervention remarks commenced during the PIP,
19-21 September, only after it became apparent that no blood
would be shed. The only other reason mentioned for
intervening in Haiti concerned domestic politics cited in 17
percent (2 of 12) of pro-intervention remarks. Members of
Congress were concerned about answering to their incumbents
and to influential groups such as the Congressional Black
Caucus
.
Of those opposed to the intervention, 65 percent (62 of
127) said the United States had no national interests at
stake (see Figure 4.5). Domestic political concerns were
also mentioned as 20 percent (26 of 127) argued that
intervention could not be justified to improve the political
standings of the President or members of Congress. Nine
percent (11 of 127) claimed intervention would not return
Haiti to democracy, either because Haiti had never been
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democracy, regardless of political trappings, or because
democracy could not be imposed on a sovereign state at
gunpoint. An additional 9 percent (11 of 127) of
Congressional opposition applauded the bloodless
intervention, but said that the lack of casualties still did
not justify the action taken by the President.
Unlike the news editorials, Congressional remarks did
not reflect an overriding concern for the credibility of the
United States with the global community (see Figure 4.5).
Credibility was not mentioned by any of the Congressional
supporters of the intervention, though 31 percent (16 of 51)
of the pro-intervention news editorials stipulated U.S.
credibility as a plausible reason to deploy troops. Only 5
percent (7 of 127) of Congressional remarks opposed to the
intervention focused on U.S. credibility as a main theme,
claiming it was an insufficient reason to intervene. As a
secondary theme U.S. credibility was consistently mentioned
in an average of 20 percent to 25 percent of both pro-
intervention and anti-intervention congressional remarks
from May through the PIP. In July, 46 percent (13 of 28) of
all Congressional remarks were concerned with U.S.
credibility as a secondary issue, probably in response to
the President waffling on U.S. refugee procedures.
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As in the news editorials, human rights was the least
cited main theme at only 1 percent (2 of 185) of the
Congressional debate (see Figure 4.5) . It was raised as the
primary issue only once in May and once in July. As a
secondary theme, it was consistently mentioned through
September, but in less than 20 percent of the remarks. The
exception occurred in May, when Congress referred to human
rights violations in 32 percent of the remarks, probably in
conjunction with the new White House policies tightening
sanctions and welcoming refugees.
In Congress, the issue of refugees was mentioned as a
main theme by 5 percent (6 of 127) of those opposed to the
intervention, 22 percent (10 of 46) of those with no
verbalized opinion on the intervention, and not at all by
the Congressional remarks supporting the intervention (see
Figure 4.5). The issue was discussed initially and most
significantly in May in response to the Presidential
decision regarding the Haitian refugee policy, then was
never mentioned after July. As a secondary theme, 41
percent (76 of 185) of Congressional remarks opposed
allowing incoming refugees on Florida's shores from May
through PIP. Congress mentioned the discriminatory refugee
policy with regard to blacks and the pressure being applied
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by the Congressional Black Caucus only once in March, twice
in April, and once for the final time in May.
F. THE PRESIDENT ON HAITI
Unlike President Reagan and President Bush, who
remained silent on the deployment of troops prior to
initiating the Grenada and Panama invasions, President
Clinton mentioned possible intervention in Haiti for the
first time in May, four months prior to the intervention.
He expressed no further opinion regarding intervention,
however, until late August when he again implied that
intervention was a "viable option." 6
The justification the President gave for the
intervention focused on both the restoration of democracy
and the protection of U.S. national interests (see Figure
4.6). Restoration of democracy was the focus of
Presidential speeches in May and September, only. The
President used democracy to sell the tightening of sanctions
in May, and then to justify military action in September.
Between June and August, President Clinton focused on
President Clinton had actually sought and gained U.N.
approval for intervention of Haiti during July 21-31, 1994. On
05 August, Congress tabled an amendment that would have mandated
congressional approval of the intervention. It was not until
after these events that the President's remarks to the public
discussed the viability of a military option.
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refugees and human rights. Democracy was not mentioned
once
.
National interests as used by the President included
Haiti's proximity to the United States, the U.S. interest in
promoting stability in the region, the interests of Haitian
Americans living in the United States, and the welfare of
U.S. citizens living in Haiti. The only time the President
removed his focus from national interests was during July
when the administration was preoccupied with finding safe
havens for refugees (see Appendix C)
.
Unlike Presidents Reagan (Grenada) and Bush (Panama)
,
President Clinton consistently insisted that a multilateral
coalition would respond to the Haiti crisis (see Figure
4.8) . He was not asking the United States to be the "Lone
Ranger." He even went so far as to gain U.N. approval for
the intervention before informing Congress of his decision.
His placement of U.N. support over that of Congress
infuriated the latter. But though the Senate and the House
took floor votes and unanimously argued that the President
should consult them prior to deploying troops, they failed
to reach consensus over the matter of legislation, so the
issue was tabled.
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President Clinton responded to reporters' questions
regarding Congress only when pressed. On 03 August, he
stated, "I have not agreed that I was constitutionally
mandated to get [Congressional approval.]" The President
subsequently addressed the political tension pervading the
nation in September during a news conference when he spoke
positively of increasing public and Congressional support.
On the day of the intervention, he remarked that he would
not rule the country by a "public opinion poll."
Though President Clinton consistently touched on the
arriving refugees as a secondary theme, (see Figure 4.7), he
only directly addressed the issue as a main theme during a
news conference in July. Even in May, when he opened the
doors to the fleeing Haitians, he clothed the issue in the
rhetoric of democracy. The President briefly mentioned
welcoming refugees in May and June. In July and September,
however, he discussed halting the influx. He never
acknowledged the issue of discrimination in his policy, even
to discount the charge.
Human rights violations were another minor theme in
presidential remarks (see Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7) . On 14
September, President Clinton elaborated on the horrendous
human rights violations committed by the Haitian military
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junta in a news conference. Outside of that conference,
human rights violations were acknowledged only as a
secondary theme in 11 of 12 Presidential remarks. President
Clinton cited such violations as almost an afterthought in
every month except July, when he refrained from mentioning
the violations because the United States was being overrun
with arriving refugees and he was attempting to effectively
manage the increase.
G. CONCLUSION
The Haiti intervention occurred at a time when the
United States was struggling to define its national
interests and its role in the post Cold War world. As a
result, the national debate was comprised of a gallimaufry
of issues, any of which was given precedence at a given
time. Three concerns were dominant however: 1) U.S.
national interests as interpreted by the public and Congress
were not clearly at stake; 2) preservation of U.S.
credibility with the world community was at stake; and 3)
multilateral action and authorization were overwhelmingly
preferred to a unilateral response by the United States.
Concern over casualties, though not specifically addressed
prior to the invasion, was evidenced by the fact that the
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country did not rally behind the President's decision until
the intervention was accomplished without bloodshed.
According to American public opinion, as expressed by
supporters of the intervention in news editorials, the
United States intervened to preserve credibility in the
global community, particularly in the western hemisphere.
Public opposition to the intervention stemmed from the
perceived lack of national strategic interests. The
majority of the public opposed the intervention up to the
day troops were deployed, but during the PIP, when no
casualties had been incurred, they rallied behind the
President. For all his questionable motives, the President
was perceived as their great leader, who dispatched a
diplomatic triumvirate to ensure a peaceful intervention.
The majority of Congress opposed the intervention even
after it was accomplished because they, like the American
public, failed to ascertain definitive U.S. national
interests at stake. The few supporters of the intervention
in Congress claimed the United States intervened in Haiti to
restore an overthrown democratic government, though many
Congressional members believed the intervention represented
an attempt to remedy domestic political tension.
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The President alone maintained that the United States
intervened because U.S. national interests included
promoting democracy and stability in the region. He led the
nation "kicking and screaming" toward an unpopular
intervention, then redeemed his cause at the last moment by
negotiating a peaceful removal of the junta, and a return to
democracy gently encouraged by the presence of U.S. forces.
Unlike the Panama invasion, multilateralism was not
addressed as a main theme during the Haiti intervention. As
a subtheme, however, support for multilateralism was
prominent in all three realms of debate: public,
Congressional, and Presidential (see Figure 4.8). As
reflected in the Gallup Poll, the public was more supportive
of deploying U.S. forces as part of a multilateral coalition
than of unilateral U.S. military action. This sentiment was
reflected in the news editorials as well. Support for
multilateral action gradually increased from May through
August, but took a sharp drop in September, when the news
editorials were opposed to U.S. intervention in Haiti
regardless of whether other nations were involved. During
the PIP, support multilateralism was again high on the
public agenda as they looked to U.N. forces to relieve U.S.
troops occupying the island (see Figure 4.8).
97
Policy makers were divided on the issue of
multilateralism. Congressional remarks revealed that
Congress did not think the United States should intervene in
Haiti in either a unilateral or multilateral form. As a
subtheme multilateralism was present in less than 20 percent
of Congressional remarks every month. The President,
however f deliberately maintained that multilateral action
was essential. From July through the PIP, President Clinton
referred to a multilateral coalition in 100 percent of his
remarks with the exception of August when in 50 percent (1
of 2) of the press conferences during the month, he focused
only on the national interests of the United States at stake
and failed to mention the preparations of the United
Nations
.
The concern for U.S. support and multilateral action,
then, was of significant concern as a subtheme to the U.S.
public and therefore to the President from the early months
preceding the intervention through the PIP. The fact that
multilateralism was not mentioned at all during the Grenada
invasion and that initial strong support for multilateralism
significantly waned during the Panama invasion indicates
that the move toward multilateral action evident during the
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Haiti intervention is a product of the post Cold War
environment
.
The discussion of credibility and domestic politics by
Congress and the public stemmed from lack of confidence in
the President's ability to handle foreign policy issues and
lack of trust between the Congress and the President. The
President knew he would have to battle a republican Congress
over the intervention and probably feared being undermined
when he needed their support. Congress disliked being left
out of the loop and worried that President Clinton was
establishing a precedent for future foreign policy
decisions. The American public keyed into the tension on
Capitol Hill, and that exacerbated their uncertainties.
Concern over casualties was not mentioned by the public
prior to deploying troops. During the PIP, however, the
lack of casualties was the primary reason for the shift of
public support for the intervention. The bloodless nature
of the invasion was mentioned as a main theme in 66 percent
(19 of 29) and as a subtheme in 100 percent (29 of 29) of
news editorials during the PIP. Congress began mentioning a
concern for potential casualties in May as a reason to
oppose the intervention. From May through September it
represented an average of 10 percent of the main themes and
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60 percent of the subthemes. Though the majority of
Congress remained opposed to the intervention, 17 percent (2
of 12) of main themes and 83 percent (10 of 12) of subthemes
in the remarks recorded during the PIP expressed relief at
the lack of casualties incurred. The President began
mentioning concern for the safety of troops on 18 September,
when he announced U.S. troops were to be sent to Haiti.
When he subsequently announced to the world that the
intervention was successful, he focused on the fact that it
was accomplished without one casualty.
A subtheme not seen in either the Grenada or Panama
case studies was the concern for the financial costs of the
intervention (see Figure 4.7). This theme probably emerged
as a result of the severe defense budget cuts during the
Clinton administration that led to a streamlining of
military training and deployments. Financial costs referred
to the expense involved in deploying military forces,
maintaining logistical support during the occupation of
Haiti, and providing financial aid packages to facilitate
Haiti's return to democracy. Though the news editorials
never reflected a concern for the financial burden, Congress
mentioned it as a subtheme from May through the PIP in an
average of 25 percent of remarks. President Clinton
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mentioned the financial expense of the intervention in one
third (4 of 12) of his remarks as a subtheme (see Figure
4.7) . He specifically addressed the cost of a proposed AID
package to Haiti at a meeting with the multinational
coalition on Haiti one week prior to the intervention.
The discussion of refugees by Congress and the public
was cued by Presidential speeches and policy shifts. The
policy shifts were in turn influenced by lobbyists and
interest groups and the appearance of red flagged words such
as "racism" and "discrimination." To a lesser extent, some
aspects of the rhetoric regarding refugees were born out of
sentiment and fear. Sentiment stirred the hearts of the
public to protest the poverty and human rights violations in
Haiti and welcome the refugees. Subsequently, fear of being
overrun, of a diminishing lifestyle, mobilized the public to
protest the huge influx of refugees.
In summary, the trends exhibited by the rhetoric
surrounding the Haiti intervention show an increasing
desire to act multilaterally; to limit conflict to defending
U.S. national interests; and to preserve U.S. credibility.
To a lesser degree, the trends point to minimizing
casualties and avoiding additional financial burdens.
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The majority of the public and Congress opposed
intervention until the PIP, when troops had deployed and the
public rallied behind the President. The statistics
gathered through the Gallup Poll indicated the U.S. public
was much more willing to support the deployment of troops as
part of a multi-lateral coalition, than as the sole force
responsible for Haiti's welfare (see Appendix D) . Aware of
public sentiment, the President' packaged the intervention as
a joint military action. He deliberately gained the support
of the United Nations and planned the diplomatic
negotiations and intervention with the support of the
multinational coalition on Haiti. In support of the
intervention, public news editorials keyed on the importance
of U.S. credibility, while Congress and the President
focused on furthering democracy. Following the deployment
of troops, all rhetoric focused on the lack of casualties.
In opposition to the intervention, public editorials and
Congress both cited the lack of national interests at stake.
The President was alone in maintaining that intervention in
Haiti furthered U.S. strategic interests.
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This thesis has assessed motives for U.S. intervention
in Grenada, Panama, and Haiti by examining excerpts from the
public, Congressional and Presidential discourse surrounding
the interventions. The larger purpose of this thesis,
however, is to link evolution in foreign policy to evolution
in national rhetoric. The exchanges between the U.S.
public, Congress, and President are significant in that they
help shape the national concept of both the identity of the
United States and the threats to that identity. These
concepts have evolved since the Cold War and the decline of
super power rivalry and resulted in a gradual alteration of
U.S. foreign policy, particularly concerning intervention
abroad. Prior to exploration of the implications of these
changes for future policy makers is a review of the major
themes extracted from the case studies and an assessment of
trends in the U.S. approach to intervention.
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
National rhetoric indicates that the United States
conducted the Grenada invasion in 1983 to: a) protect U.S.
citizens; b) curb the Communist threat; and c) aid the
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) . There was
no discussion of multilateral action. Though U.S. public
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and Congressional opposition to the invasion cited the
negative response of world leadership, those who supported
the invasion countered with the fact that the United States
was assisting the OECS in response to the organization's
request. Congress was concerned with the legality of the
invasion, both with regard to international law and U.S.
constitutional procedures. Some held that the United States
had violated the Organization of American States (OAS)
principles by intervening by force in Latin America and
reverting to gunboat diplomacy. Others held that the OECS
request superseded those principles. Congress was also
concerned that they were not consulted prior to the invasion
according to the requirements of the War Powers Act and
sought retroactively to invoke the Resolution, thereby
limiting the deployment of U.S. troops to 60 days.
Democracy and concern for casualties were present in both
the public and policy makers' debates, but not significantly
so.
In 1989, during the invasion of Panama, the issues were
somewhat different. During the months preceding the
invasion, there was a preponderance of anti-Noriega
sentiment and a desire to act in accord with the world
community (ie., the OAS). With the invasion and the period
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that followed, focus turned to protecting the U.S. citizens
in Panama that had come under occasional attack by Noriega's
thugs. Anti-Noriega sentiment transitioned into concern for
protecting U.S. citizens from his regime. Multilateral
diplomacy was gradually deemed ineffective at removing
Noriega and was replaced by the feeling that unilateral
action by the United States was the only way to get the job
done. Following the Panamanian coup attempt in October,
when the United States seemingly passed on a golden
opportunity to assist in routing Noriega, both the U.S.
public and Congress were concerned by the lack of
coordination among U.S. government agencies and the lack of
a unified policy. Congress immediately set to drafting an
amendment giving the President the authority to deploy
troops if warranted, and spent a great deal of time debating
Constitutional procedures. Congress and the President
mentioned democracy, but only when Noriega stole the
elections in May of 1989. By the December 1989 invasion,
democracy was no longer a significant issue. Concern over
Soviet response also appeared in the Congressional debate
prior to the invasion, but only briefly. As with Grenada,
on the day of the invasion there was talk only of protecting
U.S. citizens.
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In September of 1994, the United States intervened in
Haiti. A plethora of issues pervaded the debate surrounding
the invasion but a few were key: a) whether U.S. national
interests were threatened; b) whether democracy could or
should be imposed on a sovereign state; c) an insistence for
acting multilaterally; and d) prevention of casualties. The
majority of the U.S. public and Congress opposed the
intervention because they felt no national interests were at
stake. The President, however, insisted that the promotion
of democracy and stability in the Caribbean was directly
related to U.S. national interests. Promotion of democracy
was debated to a lesser degree. The President and those who
supported the invasion maintained that the United States had
a duty to encourage and protect fledgling democracies,
particularly in the western hemisphere. Those opposed to
the invasion argued that it the imposition of democracy on
another state was a contradictory and impossible task.
Though never a main theme in the debate, the concern
for a multilateral response was a consistent undercurrent,
even through the intervention. The President insisted that
the United States would not play the "Lone Ranger" in Haiti.
He not only ensured that the invasion had U.N. support, he
arranged for U.N. organizations to assume responsibility for
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monitoring Haiti's development after U.S. troops departed
the island. As early as May 1994, the public, and to a
lesser degree Congress, argued that the situation in Haiti
was a global responsibility that called for a multilateral
response. Preventing U.S. casualties was also a major
concern. Congress began mentioning it as early as May 1994,
the public began in August 1994. It was largely because the
intervention did not result in a single loss of life that
support shifted in favor of the President's decision to
deploy troops.
Additional themes debated at length during the months
preceding the Haiti intervention included: a) preserving
U.S. credibility with the global community; b) questioning
the President's political motives for the invasion; c)
debating the President's sanctions and refugee policies; and
d) human rights violations. Financial costs of the
intervention emerged for the first time as a concern of
Congress and the President, perhaps related to defense
budget cuts. This was also the first of the three case
studies in which Congress was divided along party lines with
regard to support for the intervention. Both parties,
however, agreed on one issue--the President should have
consulted them before he deployed U.S. troops.
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Though each of the interventions involved issues
specifically related to the incidents such as anti-Noriega
sentiment with Panama and refugee policies with Haiti, some
general trends can be traced through the case studies.
Table 1 summarizes differences in emphasis from the Grenada
invasion during the Cold War to the Haiti intervention of
the post Cold War era. The number of wX's" in each row
indicates impressionistically the relative emphasis of the
various topics.
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Rhetoric indicates a shift away from fear of Soviet
threat and concern for the safety of U.S. citizens living
abroad. The Soviet Union was a major factor defining U.S.
foreign policy. The threat-driven approach to intervention
was understood by the public and policy makers alike. Since
the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is less, if any,
consensus about U.S. foreign policy priorities. The shift
away from concern for U.S. citizens depicted in Table 1 is
misleading because there has been no recent threat to U.S.
citizens. The United States has typically justified
invasions by acting to protect its citizens and there is no
reason to doubt this trend will continue.
Absence of a threat-driven approach to intervention has
created a need to find a new consensus on when and where to
intervene. Hence the new emphasis during the Post Cold War
on U.S. national interests, a term vaguely defined at best
and completely subject to interpretation and debate. The
increasing concern for promoting democracy and safeguarding
human rights are partly a result of this attempt to define
national interests and the U.S. role in the world. Rhetoric
also indicates a shift in favor of multilateral response.
During the Panama invasion, multilateralism was attempted,
but gradually disregarded as ineffective by the public and
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policy makers. During the post Cold War period,
multilateralism has become a political reality.
Concurrent with multilateral responsibility and role
definition for the United States is a growing concern for
U.S. credibility, both with its allies and with upstart
dictators. Previously, neither the U.S. public nor policy
makers gave much thought to how the United States was viewed
in the world. The U.S. role as a balancing superpower was
understood and respected, at least by those in the United
States. Congress remains very aware of its role in U.S.
policy and continues to debate U.S. procedure with regard to
deploying troops. In all three of the case studies Congress
fumed over not being consulted by the President and debated
whether to invoke the War Powers Resolution. This will no
doubt continue.
An additional shift that is very significant for
intervention is the increasing lack of tolerance by the U.S.
public and Congress (who must answer to constituents) for
casualties. During the Cold War, there was concern for U.S.
casualties when crises like the Iranian hostage situation
and the Beirut bombing brought them to the forefront. But
the increasing intolerance for even a single loss of life
has only developed during recent years. During the post
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Cold War period there has even risen a concern for
minimizing opposition casualties that could yield a myriad
of political and military ramifications.
Finally, with the Haiti intervention surfaced a concern
for financial costs of deploying military forces and
participating in nationbuilding activities abroad. As the
United States contends with an increasingly unacceptable
national deficit, military deployments will be streamlined.
Inevitable defense butdget cuts will likely result in the
increasing emergence of financial costs as another main
theme in future debates on foreign intervention.
B. ASSESSMENT OF THEORY AND METHODOLOGY
As earlier stated, this thesis attempts to assess the
motives for U.S. intervention in Latin America by linking
internal rhetoric to military intervention. Internal
rhetoric alone, however, will neither fully explain nor
predict the actions the United States chooses to take in its
foreign policy.
Social constructionism, while linking internal rhetoric
to U.S. foreign policy decisions, does not account for
variables external to the United States that encourage
intervention. External variables, such as General Austin's
imposition of a "shoot on sight" curfew in Grenada, General
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Noriega's attacks on U.S. service members, and the Haitian
military junta's abandonment of the Governor's Island accord
influenced both the rhetorical debates and U.S. policy
regarding those countries. Events elsewhere in the world
may also affect U.S. policy toward a particular region.
Seemingly unrelated events can alter national agendas. The
Somalia peacekeeping mission may have delayed U.S. military
action by: a) taking precedence over the Haiti situation;
and b) leaving the United States loathe to later enter a
similar ambiguous conflict. The Bosnia-Herzegovina
hostilities, on the other hand may have represented
conflicts the United States was seeking to avoid by becoming
preoccupied with the Haiti invasion.
The social constructionist approach also fails to
consider pressures from the global community through
organizations such as the United Nations or through
multinational business organizations. These pressures will
become increasingly effective as the trend toward
multilateralism continues. Finally, the approach fails to
account for surreptitious variables that may have influenced
foreign policy, to include the hidden agendas of policy
makers who link political issues together to achieve an
obscure goal.
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The importance of social constructionism lies in its
ability to reveal how the American public and policy makers
are framing the issues of foreign policy--the reality they
are constructing through their debates. The piece of
information on which the public and policy makers choose to
focus is significant because their perceptions and reactions
will influence foreign policy decisions.
Sometimes this influence is part of a cyclical
relationship involving "real" events. In Haiti, for
example, there was a feedback loop between U.S. national
rhetoric and external response. The initially verbalized
support for democracy and fleeing refugees (as well as
pressure from political groups) caused the President to
alter U.S. refugee policy toward Haiti which spurred a flood
of refugees into Florida. The incoming masses contributed
to a shift in national rhetoric from democracy and welcoming
refugees and to a focus on national interests, which
included preventing refugees from reaching American
territory. The feedback loop represented by this one
example will likely grow more prevalent as future policy
makers seek to build a national consensus prior to
intervention.
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Whether the public and policy makers debate different
issues is significant, as is the relationship between the
debate and real world events. The result of such research
is more than a commentary on a changing society. An
understanding of society's beliefs and concerns and how they
are changing can aid political strategists in framing issues
to gain public support and influence decisions of key policy
makers .
In conjunction with the social constructionist
approach, the content analysis method of analyzing the
debates also fails to account for the external variables
that do not appear in editorials and remarks. Though
subjective articles such as editorials are straightforward
in their messages, analyst interpretation can not help but
influence coding. The main themes and subthemes were drawn
from the articles rather than imposed on them, but the
selection of themes is subject to a certain amount of
interpretation. Additionally, the binary method of coding
the subthemes as present "1", or not present "0", does not
allow for further differentiation between the subthemes that
could be included in a grading scheme of "1 - 5." The binary
method, however, simplifies the coding and leaves less to
the interpretation of the analyst.
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C. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE POLICY
If the rhetoric surrounding the three case studies is
to be considered, then future U.S. policy makers must
contend with an intervention policy chained by a)
multilateralism; b) vague, evolving national interests; c)
obstructionist Congressional procedures; and d) an
intolerance for casualties.
Though the United States still accepts leadership in
coalitions and multinational peacekeeping missions,
unilateral action by the United States is no longer
acceptable to either the U.S. public or the world community.
It is significant that the "assertive multilateralism"
representative of the early Clinton administration has been
replaced by "cautious" multilateralism, not by unilateralism
as has happened during earlier administrations. This move
toward multilateral action (or at least authorization) as
the norm has become a political fact of life in the post
Cold War world. 1
In addition to multilateralism, Presidents will always
have to contend with a Congress that demands an active role
1Linton F. Brooks and Arnold Kanter (eds) , U.S. Intervention
Policy for the Post-Cold War World , (New York: W.W. Norton and
Co., 1994) pp. 129-30.
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in U.S. foreign policy, particularly when that policy
involves deploying U.S. troops. Following each
intervention, Congress has attempted (albeit unsuccessfully)
to invoke the War Powers Resolution and has used it to apply
pressure on the President to bring U.S. troops home.
Finally, the current nature of U.S. national interests
is so vague and subject to interpretation that policy makers
would benefit by clearly delineating issues and objectives
with regard to intervention as soon as possible. This would
help guide the public debate and facilitate consensus
building. The "rally around the flag'7' phenomenon during the
Post Invasion Period (PIP) is still present, and will likely
continue if casualties are kept to a minimum.
The internal rhetoric surrounding the three most recent
interventions in Latin America contributes to an
understanding of the internal variables affecting U.S.
foreign policy. Alone, the information is incomplete, but
when combined with analysis of the external variables that
affect the actions of states, the results are a
comprehensive understanding of the dynamic nature of U.S.
foreign policy and an insight into the nature of
interventions in the post Cold War world.
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APPENDIX A. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS PRECEDING THE U.S. INVASION
OF GRENADA:
1979 Mar 13 - Grenada's Prime Minister Eric Gairy overthrown
in bloodless coup led by Maurice Bishop, who
assumed position; constitution suspended; a
People's Revolutionary Government known as
the New Jewel Movement (NJM) established.
Apr 16 - U.S. State Department threatened curtailment
of aid to Grenada if Bishop continued close
relations with Cuba.
Nov 17 - Bishop announced project to build new airport
with Cuba; U.S. -Grenada relations further
deteriorated.
1980 May - Deputy Prime minister Bernard Coard visited
Soviet Union.
Nov - Ronald Reagan elected U.S. President.
1982 Apr - Reagan addressed Bishop's Cuban and Soviet
relations with Caribbean prime ministers.
Jul - Bishop again visited the Soviet Union.
1983 Mar 23 - Reagan cited Soviet buildup in national
televised address and showed reconnaissance
photos of Soviet-sponsored airport under
construction in Grenada.
Apr 27 - Reagan addressed joint session of Congress and
mentions Grenada and its potential for
becoming key link for Soviet-Cuban and
terrorist activities in Caribbean and Central
America
.
May, Jun - Bishop visited Washington D.C. and tried to
meet with Reagan who refused. Bishop instead
met with National Security Advisor William
Clark and low-level State-Department
personnel
.
Aug 25 - IMF approved $14.1 million loan for Grenada,
over U.S. opposition.
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Sep 27 - NJM Central Committee members passed
resolution to split Bishop's duties with
Bernard Coard.
Oct 08 - Bishop departed Grenada for Eastern Europe and
the Soviet Union, with a return stopover in
Cuba.
Oct 10 - The People's Revolutionary Government (PRG)
under Prime Minister Maurice Bishop,
announced dates for public hearings on a new
constitution being drafted by a special
commission headed by Trinidad lawyer, Alan
Alexander.
Oct 12 - Rumors circulated that Bernard Coard and his
wife were trying to kill Bishop; streets of
St. George's empty as rumor spreads. Bishop,
asked to relieve tension, denied rumor on
radio
.
Oct 13 - Meeting held to discuss joint leadership
issue; Bishop accused of initiating rumor,
expelled from NJM for refusing to share power
with Coard and placed under house arrest.
Oct 14 - Rumors of an attempted coup in Grenada swept
the Caribbean. Information Minister Selwyn
Strachan announced at noon that Bishop was
replaced by Deputy Prime Minister Bernard
Coard. At 1530, government radio announced
Coard' s resignation.
Oct 15 - Kendrick Radix, Minister of Agriculture, led a
rally urging crowd to support Bishop, and
resigned as minister; arrested along with
several others.
Oct 18 - General Huason Austin, Grenada's army
commander, gave account of events leading up
to crisis on Grenada State Radio. Unison
Whiteman Announced resignation of five
ministers, including himself; students
protested--"No Bishop, No School."
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Oct 19 - Bishop rescued from House arrest by
supporters, but is subsequently killed by
soldiers along with five other prominent NJM
members- Revolutionary Military Council led
by General Hudson Austin assumed leadership of
Grenada. Twenty- four hour "shoot on sight"
curfew imposed through Oct 24.
Oct 21 - The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
(OECS) met in emergency conference in Barbados
to discuss Grenada situation; leaders decided
on invasion.
U.S. Marines and 10 ship task force rerouted
from en route Lebanon to Grenada .
Oct 22 - OECS formally requested U.S. and Britain's
participation in invasion. U.S., Canadian,
and British diplomatic officials flew to
St. George's to investigate status of their
nationals in Grenada and to assess situation.
Oct 22-23 - Caribbean Community (Caricom) heads of
government met in Port of Spain, Trinidad, to
discuss Grenada situation. Diplomatic and
trade sanctions imposed against Grenada.
Oct 25 - U.S. Marines and Rangers and a small force from
six Caribbean states invaded Grenada. U.S.
Press banned from location for alleged
security reasons.
Oct 2 6 - U.S. troops opened Pearls airport and
evacuated U.S. citizens (approximately 500
U.S. medical students).
Oct 31 - Press ban lifted; U.S. military conducted
daily escort trips for Press from Barbados.
Nov 04 - U.S. Government released press copies of Arms
Pact Agreements between Grenada, Soviets,
Cuba, and North Korea.
Nov 15 - Interim government of Grenadian technocrats
appointed to guide Grenada until elections are
held.
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Sources: Schraeder, Peter J. (ed) . Intervention into the
1990's . (Boulder, Co: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1992.)
Additional information drawn from pertinent volumes of Facts
on File and Congressional Quarterly.
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APPENDIX B. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS PRECEDING THE U.S. INVASION
OF PANAMA
1987 Jun 06 - Colonel Roberto Diaz Herrera confessed to
his own crimes on behalf of the regime and
charged Noriega with electoral fraud, drug
trafficking, and Hugo Spadafora's
(Panamanian Activist) murder. The PDF was
split. Unprecedented public protest ensued.
Jun 27 - The Panamanian Senate passed resolution
239, calling on Noriega et al to step down
pending investigation, and expressed
support for the restoration of democracy.
Jun - President Reagan's administration supported
popular nonviolent opposition to Noriega
through the National Endowment for
Democracy and unofficial contacts with
various leaders.
Aug-Nov - Retired Admiral Daniel J. Murphy attempted
aprivate "back channel" mission to
negotiate Noriega's resignation. The
mission failed.
Dec - Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, Richard
Armitage, met with Noriega to strongly
support Noriega's graceful departure from
power.
1988 Jan - U.S. worked through Panamanian official and
advisor to Noriega, Jose Blandon to outline
Noriega's phased return to the barracks.
Noriega rejected the plan.
Feb - U.S. issued indictments against Noriega
(drugs)
.
Feb 28 - Panamanian President Eric Arturo Delvalle
was impeached after trying to fire Noriega.
Mar 16 - U.S. supported coup attempt defeated.
Officers were imprisoned.
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Apr-May 25 - Assistant Secretary of State Michael Kozak
attempted negotiations with Noriega,
(agreeing to drop indictments), and failed.
U.S. enacted sanctions.
1989 May 07 - Panama's election monitored by outside
observers
.
May 09 - President Bush denounced the election as
fraudulent and called on Noriega to resign.
May 10 - Panamanian Government anulled the election,
claiming foreign interference.
May 11 - President Bush ordered 20,000 additional
troops to Panama, and recalled the U.S.
Ambassador to Panama. All service members
and their families in Panama were moved
onto military bases.
Jun/Aug - U.S. supported multilateral negotiations,
but the OAS failed to reach consensus among
Panamanian government, opposition, and
military.
Aug 08 - U.S. arrested 29 armed Panamanians in a
restricted area during a military exercise
in Panama.
Aug 09 - PDF detained two U.S. servicemen. U.S.
troops closed a combined U.S . -Panamanian
Base until their release.
Sep 01 - Francisco Rodriguez sworn in as president
of Panama. Rodriuez, a friend of Noriega
was nominated by the Council of State after
efforts ~o form a transitional coalition
government failed. President Bush refused
to recognize the new government and called
for stricter sanctions.
Oct 03 - Second PDF coup (passively supported by
U.S.) failed. Participants were executed.
126
Dec 15 - Noriega appointed "Maximum Leader of the
struggle for national liberation" by-
Panama's National Assembly. The Assembly
also declared Panama in a "state of war"
against the U.S.
Dec 16 - First Lt Robert Paz, U.S. Marine Corps,
died from wounds received when a car
carrying four U.S. soldiers was fired upon
as it ran a PDF roadblock near U.S.
military Headquarters. Two U.S. witnesses
to that event, a Navy officer and his wife
were brutally interrogated by the PDF.
Dec 17 - A U.S. Army Lt . (thinking he was about to
be fired upon) shot a Panamanian policeman
near Military headquarters. Washington
interpreted these events as a pattern of
escalated threats to U.S. personnel.
President Bush gave the order to implement
Operation Just Cause.
Dec 19 - U.S. conducted nighttime invasion with
approximately 13000 troops in addition to
those permanently stationed in Panama.
Dec 23 - U.S. deployed 2,000 additional troops.
Dec 24 - Noriega took refuge at Catholic
ambassadorial residence in Panama City.
1990 Jan 04 - Noriega surrendered to U.S. officials.
Sources: Schraeder, Peter J. (ed) . Intervention into the
1990'
s
. (Boulder, Co: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1992.) John
T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the
Restoration of Panama
,
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992), p. 1.
Additional information drawn from pertinent volumes of Facts
on File and Congressional Quarterly .
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APPENDIX C. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS PRECEDING THE U.S. INVASION
OF HAITI
1990 Dec 16 - Populist priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide won
Haiti's presidential election in a
landslide.
1991 Sep 30 - Haitian military overthrew Aristide in a
bloody coup led by Gen. Raoul Cedras . OAS
imposed sanctions against Haiti.
1992 May 24 - President Bush deployed the Coast Guard to
intercept and repatriate Haitian "boat
people." Presidential Candidate Clinton
criticized Bush's policy, saying he would
"try to turn up the heat and try to restore
the elected government and let the refugees
stay here.
"
1993 Jun 14 - President-elect Clinton reversed opinion
and announced that he would continue Bush's
policy of repatriating fleeing Haitians.
Jun 16 - U.N imposed oil and arms embargo against
Haiti.
Jul 03 - Haitian leaders met under U.S. auspices at
Governor's Island and agreed to restore
Aristide and the elected government by
October 30, 1993.
Oct 11 - Armed Haitians prevented U.S. and Canadian
engineers aboard the USS Harlan County from
coming ashore at Port-au-Prince to aid in
reconstruction projects called for under
the Governors Island Agreement.
Oct 21 - The Senate rejected an attempt to prohibit
defense appropriations from being spent on
an invasion of Haiti unless U.S. citizens
are at risk. The Senate approved a sense
of the Senate amendmentthat all military
activities in Haiti should have prior
approval from Congress unless there is an
imminent risk to U.S. citizens in Haiti.
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Oct 30 - Aristide remained in exile in the United
States
.
Nov - President Clinton sent six warships to the
area to enforce U.N. sanctions reimposed
following the violation of the Governor's
Island Accord.
1994 Feb 15 - U.S. urged Aristide to embrace peace plan
by parliament calling on Aristide to name a
prime minister to form a broad-based
government. The hoped for result was that
Cedras would resign and parliament would
grant amnesty to the military leaders.
Aristide refused in a split with the White
House
.
Feb 20 - At least five Haitian Refugees drowned en
route Florida.
Feb 28 - U.S. Coast Guard repatriated 141 Haitian
refugees, forcing them to disembark their
unsafe boat in international waters.
Mar 02 - Aristide criticized U.S. immigration policy
to the U.N. Human Rights Commission in
Geneva.
Mar 10 - Three Aristide supporters were shot in
Miami, Florida. Year total of people killed
by military in Haiti reached seventy.
Mar 23 - U.S. Congressional Black Caucus called upon
President Clinton to adopt an 11-point
program that included political-asylum
hearings for Haitians in international
waters, and the resignation of Lawrence
Pezullo, Clinton's special envoy to Haiti.
Called Clinton's current policy "racist."
Apr - Haitian military increased repression and
terrorist tactics. U.N. human rights
monitors reported 112 summary executions
since Jan 31.
130
Apr 11 - Florida Governor sued the U.S. government
for reimbursement of expenses spent on
social services spent on illegal immigrants
in the state, many of whom were from Haiti.
Apr 12 - Randall Robinson, director of TransAfrica,
began hunger strike to protest U.S. policy.
Apr 21 - Six House Democrats were arrested for
staging a protest sit-in at the front of
the White House.
Apr 22 - U.S. Coast Guard intercepted over 400
Haitians in a wooden freighter in U.S.
territorial waters and escorted them ashore
in Florida. The refugees were held in
custody by immigration officials because of
an outbreak of violence on board the
Haitian ship.
May 06 - U.N. broadened Haiti embargo to halt
private aircraft travel and all goods to
Haiti except food, medicine and cooking
fuels. Embargo went into effect on May 22,
1994.
May 08 - Pres. Clinton set new asylum policy to
include at-sea political-asylum interviews
of Haitians in international waters.
William H. Gray replaced Lawrence Pezullo
as the special envoy to Haiti.
May 11 - Defiant military junta appointed Emile
Jonaissant provisional president.
Jun 10 - Political Asylum interviews continued at
sea and at safe havens. President Clinton
cut off U.S. commercial flights to Haiti
and tightened other sanctions.
Jun 28 - Clinton re-opened the refugee processing
station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to process
Haitian refugees.
Jul 04 - Additional 150 refugees drowned en route
Florida.
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Jul 06 - As thousands of Haitians took to the seas,
Clinton announced that only those who
applied for asylum from offices in Haiti
would be allowed in the United States. Boat
people would be returned or taken to safe
havens
.
Jul 07 - U.S. forces, including 2,000 marines
stationed off the shores of Haiti
reportedly practiced for invasion. Panama
withdrew as a candidate for safehaven.
Jul 11 - Junta ordered Human Rights monitors out of
Haiti.
Jul 21 - Clinton sought U.N. approval for invasion
of Haiti. Authorization granted July 31,
1994.
Aug 05 - The Senate tabled an amendment that would
have mandated congressional approval before
invading Haiti.
Aug 2 8 - Approximately 2 U.S. military police and
45 Haitian refugees sustained injuries
during a four-hour long altercation at
Guantanamo Bay refugee processing center.
Sep 15 - Clinton issued televised ultimatum to
Haitian dictators during national address:
"Leave now or we will force you from
power .
"
Sep 18 - The Carter delegation met with the Haitian
military leaders who agreed to relinquish
power. Military aircraft were dispatched en
route Haiti. Clinton announced the
agreement in a national address.
Sep 19 - U.S. forces began arriving in Haiti.
Sep 20 - Additional 1800 U.S. marines landed in Cap-
Haitien.
Source: Information drawn from pertinent volumes of Facts on
File and Congressional Quarterly .
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APPENDIX D. GALLUP POLL SURVEY QUESTIONS
July 15-17, 1994:
1) Question : "Next on the country of Haiti... if all other
diplomatic efforts, including economic sanctions, fail to
restore a democratic government in Haiti, which of the
following do you think the United States should do to reach
that goal: Send U.S. military troops to Haiti, but only if
other countries participate with the United States; send
U.S. military troops to Haiti, regardless of whether or not
other countries participate with the United States, or do
you think the United States should not send military troops
to Haiti at all, in order to restore a democratic government
there?"
Response : Send troops with others - 43%; Do not send
troops - 41%; send troops unilaterally - 11%; no opinion -
D "6 .
September 14-15, 1994:
1) Question : "Here are some reasons President Clinton has
given for sending U.S. troops to Haiti. Please tell me
whether you think it is worth sending U.S. troops to Haiti
for each of the following reasons, or not.
First, . . .Next, . .
.
(RANDOM ORDER)
a. "To stop the abuse of human rights by the current
government in Haiti."
Response : Worth it - 67%; not - 31%; no opinion - 2%.
b. "To reduce the flow of Haitian refugees to the
U.S."
Response : Worth it - 56%; not - 43%; No opinion - 1%.
c. "To promote democracy in Latin America by restoring
the democratically elected government in Haiti."
Response : Worth it - 55%; not - 43%; no opinion 2%.
d. "To maintain U.S. credibility in the world by
carrying out Clinton's pledge to remove the current military
government in Haiti."
Response: Worth it - 40%; not - 58%; no opinion - 2%.
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2) Question : "If all other diplomatic efforts, including
economic sanctions, fail to restore a democratic government
in Haiti, do you think the United States should send
military troops to Haiti along with troops from other
countries, or should the United States not send military
troops to Haiti at all?"
Response : (Sep 14, pre-speech) , Send troops - 40%; do
not send troops - 48%; other - 1%; no opinion - 12%.
Response : (Sep 15, post-speech), Send troops - 56%; do
not send troops • 41%; other - 1%; no opinion - 2%.
3) Qu estion : " Li> general, did you find the arguments
President Clinton made for sencUng U S. troops to Haiti very
convincing, somewhat convincing, not very convincing or nc :
at all convinc.iiicr?"
Response : Very convincing - 27%; somewhat convincing -
39%; not very convincing - 17%; not at all convincing - 16%;
no opinion - 1%.
4) Question : "If Clinton is going to send U.S. troops to
Haiti, do you think he should first get approval from
Congress, or do you not think so?"
Response : Get approval - 63%; approval not necessary -
35%; no opinion - 2%.
5) Question : "If Bill Clinton does send troops into Haiti,
do you think improving his own political standing will be
his main reason for sending U.S. troops to Haiti, one of his
reasons; or not one of his reasons?"
Response : Main reason - 14%; one reason - 44%; not a
reason - 41%; no opinion - 1%.
6) Question : "Do you agree or disagree with the following
statement: The United States has interests in Haiti that





Agree - 44%; disagree - 51%; no opinion - 5%.
Sources: David W. Moore, "America Hesitant About War in
Haiti," The Gallup Poll Monthly , July 1994, pp. 30-31, and
David W. Moore and Lydia Saad, "After Clinton Speech: Public
Shifts in Favor of Haiti Invasion, " Gallup Poll Monthly
,
September 1994, pp. 16-17.
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